India Consumer Health Data Aggregator — Product Research Report and Playbook
Version 1.1 (research edition of Playbook v1.0) · 21 October 2026
Document control and verification status
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Working reference for product, engineering, clinical and compliance teams building a consent-based consumer health data aggregator (“Individual Health Data Aggregator”) in India |
| Builds on | India Consumer Health Data Aggregator Playbook v1.0 (21 Oct 2026). This edition restructures it into the requested 15-section report, adds the source-by-source data map, graph model, journeys and insight engine, and corrects several technical points (see box below). |
| Audience | Founders, PMs, solution architects, ABDM integration engineers, clinical safety officer, DPO/compliance counsel |
| Citation convention | [S#] refers to the Source Register in Appendix A. |
Verification status — read before relying on this document. Live web access was not available when this edition was prepared: search, page fetch and general network calls all failed. The one exception was GitHub, which let the team read NHA’s own public repositories (NHA-ABDM/NHCX and NHA-ABDM/ABDM-wrapper). Facts confirmed from those repositories are labelled V (verified in-session from an official NHA source). Other sources are labelled: A = URL supplied in the v1.0 playbook (author-supplied, not re-checked); K = official source named from the research team’s knowledge (URL or document title to be confirmed). Claims that are time-sensitive or uncertain are marked ⚠ Validate in the text. Appendix B lists them as a verification checklist. Before any external, investor, regulatory or compliance use, the checklist must be cleared against the primary source, and legal advice must be obtained on the regulatory items. All
[web:N]placeholders from v1.0 have been removed. They were not resolvable citations.
Material corrections to Playbook v1.0 made in this edition
- Who plays the AA role. In the Account Aggregator analogy, ABDM’s Consent Manager (HIE-CM) plays the AA role: a consent conduit. The consumer aggregator plays the FIU / personal-finance-app role. It stores and analyses data, so it is a full Data Fiduciary under DPDP, not a “data-blind” conduit (§5.1).
- NHCX is a provider↔︎payer exchange. Its participants are hospitals, insurers, TPAs and schemes. NHA’s NHCX participant APIs list only PAYER, PROVIDER and TPA roles [S59]. A consumer app cannot simply “integrate with NHCX” to pull eligibility or claim status. Consumer claims data in the MVP must come from document ingestion and insurer/TPA/employer partnerships. NHCX becomes relevant through a provider-SaaS line, payer partnerships, or the NHCX ABHA↔︎policy linking capability (§3.4, §4.2).
- The consumer app should integrate as an ABDM PHR app as well as an HIU. Users discover, link and pull their own records through the PHR / consent-manager-facing flows (purpose self-requested,
PATRQT). The HIU consent-request flow is used for other purposes, such as a clinician view (§5.3) ⚠ Validate.- Use ABDM purpose codes and health-information types. Free-text purposes such as
chronic_care_managementare replaced with ABDM purpose codes (e.g.CAREMGT,PATRQT) and HI types (e.g.DiagnosticReport,Prescription) (§5.4).- Consent approval is asynchronous. The v1.0 pseudocode fetched the consent artifact immediately after the request. In ABDM, approval arrives later by callback. The flow in §10.2–10.3 is corrected.
- FHIR coding errors fixed (Appendix D). The discharge summary used LOINC 34117-2 (“History and physical note”); a discharge summary is 18842-5. The lab DiagnosticReport code (comprehensive metabolic panel) did not match its HbA1c result.
- Terminology. “PHI” is a US HIPAA term. This edition uses personal health data and health data of a Data Principal in line with DPDP.
- Licensing trigger. Policy-renewal or product recommendations may trigger IRDAI intermediary licensing (§9.6, §12, §13).
- Provider cohort analytics moved to Phase 2. Cohort analytics need a separate consent purpose and a provider-side legal basis. The MVP offers consumer-initiated, time-bound “share with my doctor” instead (§11).
1. Executive Summary
The problem. An Indian family’s health data is scattered. There are paper and PDF lab reports on WhatsApp, prescriptions photographed on phones, discharge summaries in email, insurance policy schedules and e-cards from employers and retail insurers, TPA claim letters, pharmacy invoices from e-pharmacies, and step and sleep data locked in wearables. Out-of-pocket spending remains a large share of health expenditure: roughly two-fifths in recent National Health Accounts estimates [S41] ⚠ Validate latest figure. The burden of diabetes and hypertension is very large: ICMR-INDIAB estimated about 101 million people with diabetes and about 315 million with hypertension [S40]. People pay for, carry and re-explain their health history at every encounter.
The opportunity. India now has public digital rails that make a consent-first aggregator buildable:
- ABHA: health identity and addressability.
- ABDM’s HIE-CM and Gateway: consent-based discovery, linking and exchange between Health Information Providers (HIPs) and Health Information Users (HIUs), with no central record repository [S1][S2].
- NRCES FHIR R4 profiles: standard record formats [S6].
- NHCX: provider↔︎payer claims [S7][S8].
- UHI: discovery and booking [S13].
- DPDP Act 2023 and DPDP Rules 2025: the privacy baseline [S11][S12].
What to build. A consumer-first “Health + Insurance Wallet” that:
- joins ABDM as a PHR app + HIU (and optionally an HIP for re-sharing user-uploaded records);
- ingests the documents Indians actually hold (lab PDFs, prescriptions, discharge summaries, policy schedules, claim letters, pharmacy invoices) through upload, camera, email-forward and WhatsApp-forward channels with document AI and human-in-the-loop confirmation;
- reads wearable data on-device through Google Health Connect and Apple HealthKit, rather than integrating dozens of vendor clouds;
- normalizes everything into a longitudinal Individual Health Graph, where every fact carries provenance, consent ID and a trust tier (verified clinical / document-derived / device-measured / user-entered / inferred / reference knowledge);
- produces a Health Financial + Clinical Snapshot: timeline, active problems and medicines, care gaps, trends, coverage and exclusions, waiting periods, claims, and net out-of-pocket spend. Insights are framed as decision support, never diagnosis.
What not to build. No scraping of hospital, insurer, pharmacy or app portals. No credential-sharing “screen-scraper” integrations. No unconsented secondary use. No individual-level data sales. No autonomous diagnosis or prescribing.
Top recommendations
| # | Recommendation | Why |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Lead with document intelligence + ABDM PHR/HIU, not ABDM alone | Many Indian records are still paper/PDF, and structured FHIR coverage from HIPs is uneven ⚠ Validate. Documents deliver value on day one. |
| 2 | Make insurance clarity the paid wedge (coverage, waiting periods, exclusions, claim tracking, OOP spend) | The pain point is acute and money-linked. The IRDAI Customer Information Sheet gives a parseable structure [S18] ⚠ Validate. It is differentiated from pure PHR apps. |
| 3 | Design for the family from day one (caregiver/proxy, minors, elderly parents) | Indian health decisions are family-led. DPDP has specific rules for children and for persons with disability [S11][S12]. |
| 4 | Treat consent as a product surface, not a legal page | Trust is the moat. DPDP consent must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous, with easy withdrawal [S11]. |
| 5 | Build a clinical safety case before launching any risk flag | Telemedicine guidelines bar AI from counselling or prescribing [S21]. Software that drives clinical decisions may be a medical device [S22] ⚠ Validate. |
| 6 | Get regulatory opinions early on four points: IRDAI intermediary status, CDSCO SaMD classification, DPDP Significant Data Fiduciary exposure, ABDM HDM Policy retention | These decide product scope, not only paperwork. |
DPDP timing note. The DPDP Rules 2025 were notified in November 2025 with phased commencement. As understood by the research team, Consent Manager provisions commence about 12 months after notification and most Data Fiduciary obligations about 18 months after (around May 2027) [S12] ⚠ Validate. Build to the full standard now. The MVP will be in market as the obligations take effect.
2. Market Opportunity and Product Thesis
2.1 Demand drivers (India-specific)
| Driver | Evidence (cite and validate) | Product implication |
|---|---|---|
| High out-of-pocket (OOP) spending | National Health Accounts estimates show OOP at roughly 39–40% of total health expenditure for 2021-22 [S41] ⚠ Validate latest NHA release | Spend tracking and “net OOP after reimbursement” are meaningful features, not vanity metrics |
| Heavy NCD burden | ICMR-INDIAB (Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology, 2023): about 101 M diabetes, about 136 M prediabetes, about 315 M hypertension [S40] | Chronic-care tracking (HbA1c, BP, lipids, weight) is the clinical anchor use case |
| Fragmented, paper-heavy records | ABDM exists because records sit with each provider; many reports are still issued as PDF/paper (industry observation) ⚠ Validate with pilot data | Document AI is a core capability, not a fallback |
| Insurance complexity | Waiting periods, sub-limits, room-rent caps, co-pays, exclusions; IRDAI 2024 reforms on cashless timelines, PED waiting periods and the Customer Information Sheet [S18][S19] ⚠ Validate | A “Am I covered?” explainer and claim tracker address real anxiety |
| Large public insurance base | PM-JAY covers about 12 crore families (about 55 crore people); extended in 2024 to all citizens aged 70+ (Ayushman Vay Vandana) [S43] ⚠ Validate | Support PM-JAY entitlement awareness. Do not overpromise data access. |
| Digital public infrastructure | ABHA counts in the high tens of crores and tens of crores of linked records reported by PIB/ABDM dashboards [S14] ⚠ Validate current dashboard figures | ABHA linking is a realistic onboarding step for many users. Linked-record depth varies widely. |
| Smartphone-first, multilingual users | 22 scheduled languages; most new internet users prefer Indian languages (industry reports) ⚠ Validate | Vernacular UI, voice and read-aloud summaries; Bhashini as a partner option [S58] |
| Family-led decisions | Caregivers (often adult children) manage elderly parents’ care and insurance | Proxy/caregiver model with separate consent per family member |
2.2 Target users and jobs-to-be-done
| Segment | Primary job | Wedge feature | Willingness to pay (hypothesis) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Urban salaried individual (25–45) | “Keep my records and my company + personal insurance in one place” | Insurance wallet + document vault | Low–medium; prefers free with premium add-ons |
| Family caregiver (managing parents/children) | “Know my parents’ medicines, reports, policy and what is covered before an admission” | Family profiles, medicine list, pre-admission checklist | Highest; buys a family plan |
| Chronic-condition patient (diabetes, hypertension, thyroid, cardiac) | “See whether I’m improving and never miss a test” | Trends, care-gap reminders, doctor-share | Medium; high retention |
| Employer HR / benefits platform | “Reduce claim friction and support preventive care” | Group policy explainer, claims assistance | B2B contract |
| Clinician (consented view) | “See the history in 30 seconds” | Time-bound patient-shared summary | Indirect (drives consumer value) |
| Insurer / TPA | “Get complete documents first time; engage members” | Pre-submission document completeness | B2B, later phase |
2.3 Competitive landscape (positioning, not a market census)
Categories below are described from public positioning known to the research team. Every player’s ABDM integration status, features and traction must be validated against the ABDM integrator list and company sources [S14] ⚠ Validate.
| Category | Examples | What they do well | Gap this product fills |
|---|---|---|---|
| Government PHR | ABHA app (NHA), Aarogya Setu PHR features | ABHA creation, linking, consent approval | Limited insights, insurance and family-finance view |
| Private ABDM PHR apps | e.g. Eka Care, DRiefcase, Bajaj Finserv Health (reported ABDM integrations) | Record vault, ABHA flows, some vitals | Insurance clarity, OOP spend, cross-domain graph |
| E-health marketplaces | Practo, Tata 1mg, PharmEasy, Apollo 24/7 | Consults, pharmacy, diagnostics, own-service records | Data siloed to own services; commercial bias |
| Wellness/chronic-care | HealthifyMe, Ultrahuman, diabetes programmes (e.g. Sugar.fit, Fitterfly, BeatO) | Engagement, coaching, devices | Clinical records and insurance absent or thin |
| Insurance distribution/advice | Policybazaar, Ditto, Beshak and others | Policy comparison and advisory | Not a health record; regulated distribution model |
| Employer benefits/TPA apps | Plum, Loop, Onsurity; TPA apps such as Medi Assist | Group e-cards, claim intimation | Only their own policy; no clinical view |
Positioning statement: “The neutral, consent-first wallet that joins your medical records and your health money, for your whole family.” Neutrality is a design constraint (§2.5, §9.6). Marketplace revenue must never shape clinical or coverage insights.
2.4 Product thesis and core user promise
“One secure place for my family’s health: records, medicines, tests, fitness, diet, insurance, claims and out-of-pocket spend — under my control.”
- See one timeline across providers and sources, each item labelled with where it came from.
- Understand active conditions, medicines, allergies, vaccinations and due tests (care gaps).
- Track vitals, activity, sleep, nutrition and chronic-condition trends.
- Know what is covered, excluded, waiting-period restricted, or likely to need pre-authorisation, with the policy clause cited.
- Track claims, reimbursements, rejections and net out-of-pocket spend.
- Control who sees what, for what purpose and for how long, and withdraw at any time.
2.5 Monetization (carried forward from v1.0, with guardrails)
| Segment | Primary model | Secondary model | Guardrail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consumers | Freemium: free vault + ABHA; Premium (AI summaries, insurance intelligence, trends) | Family plan (likely the strongest converter, to be validated) | No paywall on consent withdrawal, data export or deletion; no dark patterns in upgrade flows [S45] |
| Employers | Annual benefits-navigation contract, per-employee pricing | Wellness/preventive modules | Employer sees only aggregated, de-identified metrics; never individual records |
| Insurers / TPAs | Document-completeness and member-engagement platform fee | Per-claim workflow pricing | Member data only with member’s specific consent; no underwriting use without separate explicit consent and legal review |
| Providers (Phase 2+) | SaaS for patient-shared summaries and care-gap lists | Usage-based document AI | Consent-scoped; clinician remains decision-maker |
| Diagnostics / pharmacy | Referral or fulfilment fee | Co-branded preventive packages | Disclose conflicts; recommendations ranked by clinical need, never by commission |
| Data products | Aggregated, de-identified, consented analytics only | — | No individual-level data sales, ever. Research use requires separate consent and ethics review [S44] |
Insurance-specific warning. Showing a user’s own coverage is information service. Recommending, comparing or facilitating purchase or renewal of insurance products may require registration as an IRDAI-regulated intermediary (e.g. insurance web aggregator, corporate agent or broker) [S47] ⚠ Validate with insurance counsel before launching any “renew/upgrade” CTA.
3. India Health Data Landscape
3.1 Ecosystem map (corrected)
Individual (Data Principal) + family/caregivers
|
ABHA number / ABHA address (identity & addressability)
|
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| | |
ABDM HIE-CM + Gateway Direct, user-consented Claims & care rails
(consent artifacts; routing; channels (outside ABDM) (participant-to-participant)
no central record store) | |
| +----------+-----------+ +----------+----------+
HIPs: hospitals, clinics, | On-device: Health | | NHCX: provider <-> |
labs, PHR apps (FHIR R4) | Connect / HealthKit | | insurer/TPA/scheme |
| | OAuth: Oura, Fitbit, | | (consumer app is |
| | Withings, Garmin* | | NOT a participant)|
| | Documents: upload, | | UHI: discovery, |
| | camera, email/WA fwd| | booking (HSPA) |
| | Manual entry | +----------+---------+
| +----------+-----------+ |
v v v
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Consumer Health Aggregator = ABDM PHR app + HIU (+ optional HIP) |
| Data Fiduciary under DPDP: stores, normalises, analyses with consent |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Individual Health Graph + Insight Engine + Consent Ledger
v
Consumer app (family) · time-bound "share with doctor" · (Phase 2+) provider / insurer views
* Garmin and Samsung cloud APIs need partner approval
3.2 Component roles
| Component | Role | Relevance to the aggregator | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| ABHA number | 14-digit health ID, created via Aadhaar or other supported verification (e.g. mobile/driving licence) ⚠ Validate current methods | Identity anchor for ABDM linking; not a record store | [S1][S2][S14] |
| ABHA address | Human-readable handle (e.g. name@abdm) used for consent
and sharing |
Primary key for ABDM consent; a user may hold more than one | [S1][S2] |
| HIP | Health Information Provider: hospital, clinic, lab, PHR app holding records and publishing care contexts | Source of verified clinical records | [S1] |
| HIU | Health Information User: requests records with a valid consent artifact | The aggregator, for consent-based pulls | [S1][S4] |
| PHR app | Patient-facing app: ABHA creation, care-context discovery and linking, consent approval, self-requested record access | The aggregator’s consumer integration mode | [S2][S5] ⚠ Validate PHR-app API scope |
| HIE-CM | Health Information Exchange–Consent Manager: creates, stores and enforces consent artifacts | Plays the AA-equivalent role; operated within ABDM today ⚠ Validate whether third-party CMs are permitted | [S2][S5] |
| Gateway | Routes discovery, consent and data-flow messages between CM, HIP and HIU | All ABDM calls go through it | [S2][S5] |
| HFR / HPR | Health Facility Registry / Healthcare Professionals Registry | Verify the facility and clinician on a record; build the provider directory | [S2] |
| NHCX | National Health Claims Exchange for eligibility, pre-auth, claims and communications between providers and payers (roles PAYER/PROVIDER/TPA) | Not directly accessible to a consumer app; see §3.4 | [S7][S8][S59] |
| UHI | Open protocol for discovery, booking, fulfilment and follow-up (EUA ↔︎ HSPA) | Later-phase booking for care gaps | [S13] |
| NRCES | National Resource Centre for EHR Standards: publishes the ABDM FHIR R4 IG; SNOMED CT National Release Centre for India | Normalization target; terminology licence | [S6][S17][S50] |
3.3 What a consumer aggregator can and cannot access
| Data | Can access? | Condition / mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Records at ABDM-integrated HIPs linked to the user’s ABHA | Yes | User discovers/links care contexts and approves consent; data pushed encrypted to the aggregator’s endpoint [S1][S4] |
| Records at providers not integrated with ABDM | Only via the user | User uploads, photographs or forwards documents; the provider can be invited to onboard as an HIP |
| Hospital/lab/insurer/pharmacy portals via the user’s password (“screen-scraping”) | No | Prohibited by this design. It violates platform terms and risks unauthorized access under the IT Act; it also undermines consent and auditability. |
| ABDM “central database” | Does not exist | ABDM is federated. Records stay with HIPs [S1][S2]. |
| Insurance claim status via NHCX | Not directly | NHCX participants are providers and payers; consumer access needs a payer/TPA partnership or a future consumer rail ⚠ Validate |
| Insurance policy data via the RBI Account Aggregator | Possibly | Insurance is an FIP category in the AA framework, but live insurance data flows are limited ⚠ Validate. The aggregator would need to be an FIU [S9][S10][S46]. |
| Wearable data | Yes | On-device (Health Connect/HealthKit) with OS permission, or vendor OAuth where available |
| Pharmacy orders/invoices | Via the user | No consumer APIs from major e-pharmacies (assumed; ⚠ Validate). Use invoice upload or email-forward. |
| Mental-health notes from therapists | Only with explicit, separate consent | Higher confidentiality expectation under the Mental Healthcare Act 2017 [S23] |
3.4 NHCX: what it is and is not for this product
- NHCX standardizes eligibility checks, pre-authorisation, claim submission, queries and settlement communications between providers and payers (insurers, TPAs, government schemes) using FHIR-based bundles [S7][S8]. IRDAI directed insurers to onboard NHCX ⚠ Validate circular reference and current onboarding counts.
- Verified from NHA’s NHCX repository [S59]:
- The participant-list API accepts the roles PAYER | PROVIDER | TPA. Onboarding requires HFR registration and ABDM M1 (ABHA creation/verification) integration.
- Payloads are JWE-encrypted (RFC 7516).
- Use-case APIs include
coverageeligibility/check,preauth/submit,claim/submit,predetermination/submit,communication/request,paymentnotice/request,insuranceplan/request,task/submitandstatus. All are asynchronous request/on_callback pairs. - Sandbox exit includes NRCeS FHIR bundle validation and a demo to NRCeS, IRDAI and NHA teams.
- A consumer PHR is not a participant role.
- Notable: the NHCX participant service also exposes “Link ABHA to policy”, “Get Policies” (by ABHA number, member ID or mobile) and “Delink ABHA” APIs [S59]. A payer or TPA calls these to associate a member’s policies with their ABHA. This is the most promising future rail for a consumer wallet to discover a user’s policies. Today it is callable only by NHCX participants, and no consumer-facing access path is documented ⚠ Validate with NHA whether PHR/consumer access to ABHA-linked policies is planned.
- Implications:
- In the MVP, consumer claims data comes from claim documents (intimation, query letters, settlement/rejection letters, discharge bills) and the user’s own status updates.
- In Phase 2, pursue payer/TPA partnerships to push claim-status events to the member’s wallet with the member’s consent.
- In Phase 3, if the company runs provider SaaS, it can take part in NHCX as the provider’s technology partner, and claim data then flows to the patient with consent.
- Normalize claim and policy documents to the NRCES/NHCX FHIR profiles (Claim, ClaimResponse, Coverage, InsurancePlan) so the move to rails needs no re-modelling [S6][S7].
3.5 Integration pathways summary
| Capability | MVP pathway | Later pathway | Standard |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clinical history, labs, prescriptions, discharge summaries | ABDM PHR + HIU; document upload | More HIPs onboarded; provider partnerships | NRCES FHIR R4 [S6] |
| Linking across providers | ABHA care-context discovery and linking | — | ABDM APIs [S5] |
| Insurance policy terms | Policy schedule / CIS upload + document AI | Insurer/TPA/employer partnership APIs; possibly AA | Internal model mapped to FHIR Coverage/InsurancePlan |
| Claims | Claim-document upload + manual status | Payer/TPA event push; NHCX via provider SaaS | FHIR Claim/ClaimResponse |
| Wearables/vitals | Health Connect, HealthKit (on-device) | Selected vendor clouds (Oura, Withings, Fitbit) | Internal metric model, LOINC/UCUM |
| Diet | In-app logging over Indian food DB; photo logging | Partnerships with nutrition apps | IFCT-based nutrient model [S34] |
| Pharmacy | Invoice/prescription upload; email-forward | e-pharmacy partnerships (order history with consent) | Internal medication model; SNOMED CT |
| Booking care-gap services | Deep links to user’s chosen provider | UHI EUA integration | UHI/Beckn [S13] |
| Clinician/facility verification | HFR/HPR lookup | — | ABDM registry APIs [S2] |
4. Source-by-Source Data Map
Feasibility key:
- High: buildable now with public SDKs/APIs or files.
- Medium: needs approval, partnership or significant engineering.
- Low: depends on third parties without public access, or is legally constrained.
Consent key:
- DPDP-C: DPDP-grade consent with notice, purpose and withdrawal.
- ABDM-CA: an ABDM consent artifact is required.
- OS-P: an OS-level health permission is required.
4.1 Medical records
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Regulatory / commercial constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABHA (number/address) | Demographics, ABHA address(es), mobile; not records | ABDM M1 APIs (create/verify/link ABHA) via sandbox → production [S5][S15] | JSON → Person, Identifier |
DPDP-C; Aadhaar-based flows follow Aadhaar rules (no storage of Aadhaar number beyond permitted use) ⚠ Validate | High | ABDM integration approval, security audit, sandbox exit [S4] | ABHA create/login in onboarding (skippable) |
| ABDM-integrated hospitals/clinics (HIPs) | Seven HI types in NHA’s reference implementation: OPConsultation, Prescription, DischargeSummary, DiagnosticReport, ImmunizationRecord, HealthDocumentRecord, WellnessRecord [S60] (an Invoice type appears in later NRCES material ⚠ Validate) | ABDM PHR discovery/link + data pull (self-requested) or HIU consent request [S1][S4] | Encrypted FHIR R4 bundles (NRCES profiles) → canonical graph; keep the raw bundle | ABDM-CA + DPDP-C; honour dataEraseAt and access
mode |
Medium | Coverage varies by HIP; many bundles carry PDFs inside
DocumentReference/Binary rather than coded
data ⚠ Validate |
Core MVP source; measure structured vs PDF share |
| ABDM-integrated labs (HIPs) | Lab reports (DiagnosticReport + Observations, often PDF) | Same as above | FHIR → LabResult; map local test names to LOINC |
ABDM-CA + DPDP-C | Medium | Lab chains’ ABDM participation varies ⚠ Validate per chain | Core; fall back to PDF upload |
| Other PHR apps (as HIPs) | Records users stored in other apps | ABDM: if the other PHR acts as HIP, the user can link and pull | FHIR (often HealthDocumentRecord) | ABDM-CA | Medium | Depends on the other app’s HIP integration | Supported automatically through the ABDM flow |
| Non-ABDM providers | Same clinical content on paper/PDF | User upload, camera scan, email-forward, WhatsApp-forward | PDF/image → OCR + clinical NER → canonical with confidence + page reference | DPDP-C; user is the source; label “document-derived” | High | OCR accuracy on handwriting is low (manual review queue) | Core MVP |
| Handwritten prescriptions | Drug names, doses, frequency, advice | Camera scan | Handwriting OCR (low confidence) → user confirmation | DPDP-C | Low–Med | Never auto-confirm; misread drug names are a safety risk | Capture image, assisted transcription, user confirms each line |
| Discharge summaries | Diagnoses, procedures, meds on discharge, follow-up | ABDM (DischargeSummary) or upload | FHIR Composition or PDF → Encounter, Condition, Procedure, MedicationRequest, CarePlan | ABDM-CA / DPDP-C | Med | Free-text heavy; clinical NER needed | Core; human-review queue for low confidence |
| Imaging reports (X-ray, USG, CT, MRI) | Report text, impression; images rarely | ABDM DiagnosticReport (imaging) or upload | PDF → DiagnosticReport(imaging); store impression text,
no auto-interpretation |
DPDP-C | Med | DICOM images are large; out of MVP scope | Store report + impression; no image viewer in MVP |
| Vaccination records | Child UIP vaccines, adult vaccines (incl. CoWIN certificates) | ABDM ImmunizationRecord, upload of cards/certificates | → Immunization with vaccine code + dose |
DPDP-C; parental consent for minors [S12] | Med | Paper immunization cards dominate for children | Upload + guided manual entry against the UIP schedule [S38] |
| Manual entry (history, allergies, family history) | Conditions, allergies, surgeries, family history | In-app forms, voice entry (vernacular) | → canonical with trust=user_entered |
DPDP-C | High | Accuracy depends on the user | Core; structured pick-lists (SNOMED-backed) |
4.2 Health insurance
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Regulatory / commercial constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retail policy schedule + policy wording | Insurer, plan, policy no., insured members, sum insured, deductibles, co-pay, room-rent limits, sub-limits, waiting periods, exclusions, riders, renewal date, premium | User upload (PDF from insurer email/app), email-forward | PDF → policy parser → InsurancePolicy,
Coverage, Exclusion,
WaitingPeriod (FHIR Coverage/InsurancePlan-aligned) |
DPDP-C | High | Wordings vary by insurer and product; clause-level citation essential | Core MVP: parse schedule + CIS; link clauses to the original page |
| Customer Information Sheet (CIS) | Standardised summary of key features, exclusions, waiting periods | Usually attached with the policy | Semi-structured → high-precision parser | DPDP-C | High | IRDAI mandates CIS in a prescribed format [S18] ⚠ Validate current format | Prioritise the CIS parser; it is the best structure available |
| Employer group policy (GMC) | E-card, member ID, TPA, sum insured (often family floater), maternity/parents cover, room-rent caps | E-card/benefit booklet upload; HR portal export; employer partnership | PDF/image → InsurancePolicy(group) |
DPDP-C; employer must not see individual data | High (upload) / Med (partnership) | Policy wording often not given to employees; benefit summary only | Upload e-card + benefit summary; B2B employer channel in Phase 2 |
| Insurer apps/portals | Policy docs, claim status, network hospitals | No public consumer APIs (assumed); partnership | — | DPDP-C + partner data-sharing agreement | Low (now) | Commercial negotiation; IRDAI rules on outsourcing/data sharing ⚠ Validate | Do not scrape; user downloads PDFs and uploads them |
| TPA portals (e.g. Medi Assist, MDIndia, FHPL, Paramount) | Claim intimation, pre-auth status, query letters, settlement letters | Partnership; user upload of letters/SMS/email | PDF/email → Claim, ClaimEvent |
DPDP-C | Low–Med | TPA contracts are with insurers; data-sharing terms needed | Email-forward of TPA mails; claim letter parser |
| Claim documents | Pre-auth approval/denial, final bill, discharge bill, settlement letter with deductions, rejection reason | Upload, email-forward | PDF → Claim, line-item Deduction,
DenialReason (taxonomy) |
DPDP-C | High | Reason text is unstructured; map to a denial taxonomy | Core MVP: claim tracker + deduction explainer |
| Cashless network hospital lists | Hospitals in the insurer/TPA network | Insurer/TPA websites publish lists (use only where terms permit), partnership | CSV/PDF → NetworkListing linked to HFR IDs |
Public business data, no personal data | Med | Website terms may restrict automated reuse; prefer licensed feeds ⚠ Validate | Phase 2 via partnership; MVP shows “check with insurer” + link |
| NHCX | Eligibility, pre-auth, claims, communications, insurance-plan exchange between provider and payer; ABHA↔︎policy linking | Participant onboarding, roles PAYER/PROVIDER/TPA only [S59] | NRCES/NHCX FHIR bundles, JWE-encrypted | Participant agreements | Low for consumer | Consumer app is not a participant (V) | Phase 3 via provider SaaS or payer partner; track ABHA-policy linking for consumer discovery |
| Account Aggregator (insurance FIP) | Policy holdings/details where insurers/repositories act as FIPs | Register as FIU; consent via an AA [S9][S10][S46] | ReBIT FI schemas → InsurancePolicy |
AA consent artefact + DPDP-C | Low–Med | Coverage of health-insurance FIPs live on AA is uncertain ⚠ Validate | Phase 2 discovery: assess FIP availability |
| e-Insurance Account (insurance repositories) | Dematerialised policies held in eIA | Consumer download; possibly via AA | PDF/statement | DPDP-C | Low–Med | Low adoption for health policies (assumed) ⚠ Validate | Accept uploads |
| PM-JAY / state schemes | Entitlement (Ayushman card), empanelled hospitals; claims are handled provider↔︎scheme | Beneficiary portals/apps; ABHA linkage ⚠ Validate | — | DPDP-C | Low | No consumer claim API known | Show eligibility info + card upload; signpost to official helpline |
| Premium payments | Premium amount, date, payer, tax-deduction eligibility (Sec 80D) | Upload premium receipt; bank SMS (not recommended) | → Premium |
DPDP-C | High | Tax advice boundaries; show information only | Upload premium receipts; renewal reminder |
4.3 Fitness and vitals
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Google Health Connect (Android) | Steps, distance, exercise, heart rate, HRV, sleep sessions/stages, weight, body fat, BP, blood glucose, SpO2, nutrition, hydration, mindfulness, etc. | On-device Android API; per-data-type runtime permission; built into Android 14+ (app install on older versions) [S26] ⚠ Validate | Records →
WearableMetric/Vital/Sleep/Activity
(LOINC/UCUM mapping) |
OS-P + DPDP-C; Google Play Health Apps declaration; background read and history read (>30 days before grant) need extra permissions [S26] ⚠ Validate | High | Play policy restricts use (no ads/data brokering) | Core MVP (Android-heavy India) |
| Apple HealthKit (iOS) | Similar set + State of Mind (iOS 17+) | On-device only; no Apple cloud API [S24] | HKSample → canonical | OS-P; App Review 5.1.3: no advertising or data-mining use, no personal health info in iCloud [S25] ⚠ Validate wording | High | Apple’s Health Records (FHIR) feature is not available in India (assumed) ⚠ Validate | Core MVP (iOS) |
| Google Fit APIs | Legacy fitness data | Deprecated; migrate to Health Connect [S27] ⚠ Validate shutdown date (2026) | — | — | Low | Being shut down | Do not build |
| Fitbit | Activity, sleep, HR, SpO2, weight | Fitbit Web API (OAuth 2.0) or via Health Connect [S28] | JSON → canonical | OAuth + DPDP-C | Med | Google is moving Fitbit APIs to a new Google Health API ⚠ Validate status | Prefer Health Connect; direct API later |
| Garmin | Activity, sleep, stress, Body Battery, HR | Garmin Connect Developer Program (Health/Activity API), approval required [S29] | Push/pull JSON → canonical | OAuth + DPDP-C | Med | Business approval; usage terms | Phase 2 |
| Samsung Health | Steps, sleep, HR, BP (Galaxy Watch), body composition | Samsung Health Data SDK (partner approval) or Samsung → Health Connect sync [S30] ⚠ Validate | → canonical | OS-P/partner | Med | Partner programme | Via Health Connect in MVP |
| Oura | Sleep, readiness, HRV, temperature trend, activity | Oura Cloud API v2 (OAuth 2.0) [S31] ⚠ Validate PAT deprecation | JSON → canonical | OAuth + DPDP-C | High | Small India base | Phase 2 |
| Withings (scales, BP) | Weight, body composition, BP, ECG summary | Withings Public API (OAuth) [S32] | JSON → canonical | OAuth | High | Small India base | Phase 2 |
| Indian wearables (Noise, boAt, Fire-Boltt, Amazfit/Zepp, Ultrahuman) | Steps, HR, sleep, SpO2 (accuracy varies) | Mostly through Health Connect/HealthKit sync from the brand app; direct APIs uncommon ⚠ Validate per brand | → canonical with device_class=consumer_wearable |
OS-P | Med | Data quality varies; consumer wearables are not diagnostic devices | Via Health Connect/HealthKit; label as “device-measured, non-clinical” |
| BP monitors (Omron, Dr Trust, others) | Systolic/diastolic, pulse | Brand app → Health Connect/HealthKit where supported; else manual/photo of display | → Vital(BP) LOINC 85354-9 panel / 8480-6 systolic /
8462-4 diastolic |
OS-P | Med | Validate device sync per brand | Health Connect + manual entry with photo |
| Glucometers (Accu-Chek, OneTouch, Dr Morepen, BeatO) | SMBG readings | Brand app sync/Health Connect where supported; manual entry | → Vital(glucose) with meal context |
OS-P | Med | Many Indian meters have no export | Manual entry with fasting/post-meal tags |
| CGM (FreeStyle Libre, Ultrahuman M1) | Continuous glucose | No public consumer API known for LibreView ⚠ Validate; CSV export from vendor apps; Health Connect where vendor writes | CSV → time series | DPDP-C | Low–Med | Vendor terms; clinical interpretation risk | Phase 2: CSV import; show trends only |
| Smart scales | Weight, BMI, body-fat estimates | Health Connect/HealthKit or vendor OAuth | → Vital(weight) |
OS-P | High | Body-fat estimates are approximate | Via Health Connect |
4.4 Diet and nutrition
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IFCT 2017 (ICMR-NIN) | Nutrient composition of Indian foods (raw foods) | Published by ICMR-NIN (book/digital); licensing terms for commercial digital reuse ⚠ Validate [S34] | Reference table → FoodItem nutrients |
Reference data | Med | Covers raw ingredients, not cooked regional dishes | License/obtain permission; base nutrient layer |
| Indian recipe/dish databases (e.g. Indian Nutrient Databank and similar academic efforts) | Cooked-dish nutrients for regional dishes | Academic/open datasets ⚠ Validate licence and provenance | Recipe → nutrients via IFCT | Reference data | Med | Portion sizes (katori, roti) need standardisation | Build a curated dish DB with dietitian review |
| ICMR-NIN Dietary Guidelines for Indians (2024) and Nutrient Requirements (2020) | RDAs/EARs, dietary guidance | Public documents [S34] ⚠ Validate | Rules → NutritionTarget |
Reference | High | Guidance must be presented as general, not prescriptive | Default targets; clinician can override |
| Indian nutrition apps (HealthifyMe etc.) | Food logs, calories, macros | No public API known ⚠ Validate; may write nutrition to Health Connect/HealthKit | → NutritionLog |
OS-P | Low–Med | Commercial partnership needed for direct data | Read nutrition records via Health Connect/HealthKit where written |
| In-app food logging | Meals, portions, water, supplements | Native, vernacular dish search, voice, photo | → NutritionLog with
trust=user_entered |
DPDP-C | High | Food photo AI accuracy is moderate | Simple logging for chronic-care users; photo logging later |
| Food delivery/grocery receipts (Swiggy, Zomato, Blinkit, Zepto, BigBasket) | Items, restaurant, time, cost | No consumer APIs; email-forward/upload of invoices | Email/PDF → item list → approximate nutrition | DPDP-C; highly sensitive inference (eating patterns) — opt-in only | Low–Med | Gmail API inbox access is a restricted scope: Google verification plus annual third-party security assessment (CASA) [S33] ⚠ Validate. Prefer user-initiated forwarding to a unique inbound address. | Phase 3, opt-in only; never infer from bank SMS |
| Supplements/Ayurveda | Supplement names, dose | Manual entry, label photo | → Medication(type=supplement) |
DPDP-C | High | Interaction data for herbal products is sparse | Capture in the medicine list; flag “interaction data limited” |
| Packaged food labels | Nutrition facts | Label photo OCR | → nutrients per serving | DPDP-C | Med | FSSAI labelling formats; front-of-pack rules still evolving ⚠ Validate | Phase 3 |
4.5 Pharmacy and medication
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E-pharmacy invoices (Tata 1mg, PharmEasy, Apollo 24/7, Netmeds, Truemeds) | Brand, strength, quantity, date, price, prescriber (sometimes) | Upload, email-forward; no consumer APIs known ⚠ Validate; partnership later | PDF → MedicationDispense → brand→molecule mapping |
DPDP-C | High (upload) | E-pharmacy rules still in draft form (Draft Drugs and Cosmetics Amendment Rules, 2018) with litigation ⚠ Validate current status [S52] | Core MVP: invoice parser feeds the medicine list and spend |
| Offline pharmacy bills | Same, often thermal-printed or handwritten | Camera scan | OCR (low quality) → user confirm | DPDP-C | Med | Faded thermal paper | Capture + confirm |
| Prescriptions (ABDM or paper) | Drug, dose, frequency, duration, advice | ABDM Prescription HI type; upload | FHIR MedicationRequest / OCR | ABDM-CA / DPDP-C | Med | Handwriting | Core |
| Brand→molecule mapping | Molecule(s), strength, form, schedule (H/H1/X) | Licensed commercial Indian drug database (e.g. CIMS/MIMS India) or curated build from public lists (CDSCO approvals, NLEM, Jan Aushadhi product list) [S35][S36] | → internal DrugProduct → molecule → ATC/SNOMED CT |
Reference | Med | No complete free Indian brand dictionary (assumed); licensing cost | Partner/license for MVP; supplement with curation |
| Drug-interaction knowledge | DDI severity, duplicate therapy, contraindications | Licensed clinical knowledge base (e.g. First Databank, Medi-Span, Lexicomp, DrugBank commercial) | Molecule-level rules | Reference | Med | Licence cost; must map Indian brands → molecules; clinical governance of alert thresholds | Phase 2 with clinician-reviewed severity filter; MVP shows duplicate-molecule detection only |
| Terminology | SNOMED CT (incl. India drug extension) | SNOMED CT free for use in India via NRCES as National Release Centre [S50] ⚠ Validate terms and drug-extension scope | Codes | — | High | Affiliate licence registration | Use SNOMED CT + ATC |
| Medicine reminders/adherence | Taken/missed doses | In-app reminders; caregiver nudges; WhatsApp reminders via WhatsApp Business API (opt-in) | → AdherenceEvent |
DPDP-C; WhatsApp template-message and opt-in rules | High | Notification fatigue | MVP: reminders + refill-due estimate |
4.6 Diagnostics
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lab chains (Dr Lal PathLabs, Metropolis, Thyrocare, Agilus/SRL, Apollo Diagnostics, Redcliffe, Tata 1mg Labs) | Test results, reference ranges, flags, PDFs | ABDM HIP where integrated ⚠ Validate each; otherwise PDF via email/WhatsApp/download | FHIR or PDF → LabResult (LOINC mapping, UCUM units,
lab-specific reference range retained) |
ABDM-CA / DPDP-C | High (PDF) / Med (ABDM) | Template diversity is huge; report layout drift | Core MVP: lab PDF parser with per-lab templates + generic table extraction; partner with 2–3 chains |
| Preventive health check packages | Bundled panels (CBC, lipid, LFT, KFT, HbA1c, TSH, vitamin D/B12, urine) | Same | Same | Same | High | Same | Core; “health check summary” view |
| At-home tests (glucose, pregnancy, rapid antigen) | Self-reported results | Manual entry/photo | → LabResult(trust=user_entered) |
DPDP-C | High | Not lab-verified | Allow; label clearly |
| Hospital in-house labs | Same | ABDM where hospital is an HIP; else PDF | Same | Same | Med | — | Via ABDM/upload |
| Reference ranges & units | Lab-specific ranges | From the report | Store the lab’s range; do not substitute a generic range for flags | — | High | Units differ (mg/dL vs mmol/L) | Unit normalisation with UCUM; keep the original |
4.7 Mental wellbeing (explicit, separate opt-in)
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-reported mood/stress check-ins | Mood scale, tags, notes | In-app | → MoodLog |
Separate opt-in purpose; excluded from family/caregiver view and doctor-share by default; never used for marketing | High | Mental Healthcare Act 2017 confidentiality principles [S23] | Phase 2; local-first option |
| Validated screeners (e.g. PHQ-9, GAD-7) | Scores | In-app questionnaire | → Observation(screener) |
Separate opt-in; crisis routing when thresholds/self-harm item triggered | High | Licensing of instruments ⚠ Validate; clinical escalation pathway required | Phase 2 with clinical safety sign-off |
| Sleep, HRV, mindfulness minutes | From wearables | Health Connect/HealthKit (incl. iOS State of Mind) | → Sleep, WearableMetric |
OS-P; treated as wellbeing context | High | Not diagnostic | MVP: show sleep; stress inference not in MVP |
| Therapy notes/journals | Free text | User-entered only; no therapist-system integration in MVP | Encrypted, optionally on-device only | Highest sensitivity; excluded from AI by default | Med | Professional confidentiality | Phase 3, on-device encrypted journal |
| Crisis resources | Tele-MANAS 14416 / 1-800-891-4416; emergency 112 [S39] ⚠ Validate numbers before release | Static content | — | — | High | Must be correct and localised | MVP: always available from Help and from any crisis trigger |
4.8 Family and context
| Source | Data available | Access mechanism | Format → normalization | Consent / privacy | Feas. | Constraint | MVP approach |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependents (children <18) | Child profile, vaccinations, growth, records | Parent creates; child ABHA where supported ⚠ Validate | → Person(dependent) + Relationship |
Verifiable parental consent under DPDP s.9 and Rules [S11][S12]; no tracking or targeted ads for children | High | Age-gating; transition at 18 (hand over control) | MVP |
| Adult dependents (elderly parents, spouse) | Same as individual | Invite flow: the adult consents in their own right (OTP on their phone) or appoints the caregiver | → CaregiverGrant |
The adult’s own consent; for persons unable to consent, lawful guardian rules [S12] ⚠ Validate | High | Never let one adult silently manage another adult’s data | MVP: invite + assisted-consent mode |
| Family history / hereditary risk | Conditions in relatives | Manual entry | → FamilyHistory (SNOMED) |
DPDP-C; it is data about relatives, so collect minimally | High | Third-party data | MVP: simple first-degree relatives form |
| Lifestyle (tobacco, alcohol, activity) | Self-report | Questionnaire | → RiskFactor |
DPDP-C | High | Social-desirability bias | MVP |
| Occupation, travel, exposure | Shift work, dust/chemical exposure, travel to endemic areas | Questionnaire | → RiskFactor |
DPDP-C; optional | High | Minimise | Phase 2 |
| Environmental (air quality) | Local AQI | Public AQI feeds (e.g. CPCB) by coarse location ⚠ Validate terms | → EnvironmentContext |
Coarse location only, opt-in | Med | Location sensitivity | Phase 3 (asthma/COPD use case) |
5. ABDM and Consent Architecture
5.1 Financial AA vs ABDM: map the analogy correctly
The most common design error is to treat the consumer app as the “health Account Aggregator”. In the RBI framework the AA is a data-blind consent conduit: it cannot see or store the financial data it moves [S10][S46]. In ABDM, the HIE-CM plays that conduit role [S1][S2]. A consumer health aggregator that stores, normalises and analyses records is the equivalent of an FIU / personal-finance app. It is therefore a Data Fiduciary with full DPDP obligations [S11].
| Dimension | Financial Account Aggregator | ABDM health exchange | Where the consumer health aggregator sits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulator / owner | RBI; AAs are NBFC-AAs under the 2016 Master Direction [S10] | National Health Authority (ABDM) [S1][S14] | DPDP (MeitY/DPB), ABDM policies, plus sector rules (IRDAI, CDSCO, NMC) depending on features |
| Consent conduit | AA (data-blind) | HIE-CM + Gateway [S2] | Not the conduit; it is a consent requester and consent UI (PHR) |
| Data holder | FIP (bank, insurer, MF, GSTN) [S9] | HIP (hospital, clinic, lab, PHR) [S1] | Can also be an HIP when re-sharing user-uploaded documents |
| Data requester | FIU (lender, wealth app) | HIU [S1] | HIU (and PHR app) |
| Consent standard | ReBIT consent artefact [S46] | ABDM consent artifact: purpose, HI types, care contexts,
permission{accessMode, dateRange, dataEraseAt, frequency}
[S60] |
Must honour the artifact and run its own DPDP consent ledger for non-ABDM sources |
| Data format | ReBIT FI schemas | NRCES FHIR R4 [S6] | FHIR as the canonical exchange format; internal graph for analytics |
| Encryption in transit | Per-session keys | ECDH key agreement on Curve25519, HKDF-derived key, AES-GCM; bundles pushed to the HIU’s data-push URL [S60] | Generate fresh key pairs per data request; never reuse |
| Retention | AA cannot store data | Federated; no central record store [S1][S2]; artifact carries
dataEraseAt [S60] |
Must purge or crypto-shred ABDM-sourced data at
dataEraseAt or on revocation |
| Adjacent rails | — | NHCX (claims) [S59], UHI (discovery/booking) [S13] | Partnerships and provider SaaS give access to these rails |
| Product analogy | “My money across banks, investments, insurance” | “My records across hospitals and labs” | “My health and my health money across records, devices, documents and insurance” |
Implication. Health data in India is more fragmented and more paper-based than financial data. ABDM covers only part of the record landscape. The product must combine ABDM with documents, devices and partnerships. The DPDP posture should be a custodian with minimal retention, not a data lake.
5.2 ABDM building blocks explained for the product team
| Concept | Explanation | Product design consequence |
|---|---|---|
| ABHA number | A 14-digit identifier created with Aadhaar or driving-licence-based verification (per NHA’s NHCX guide, which lists “Create ABHA number using Aadhaar / Driving License”) [S59] | Offer creation in-app (M1). Never make ABHA mandatory for basic use. |
| ABHA address | A user-chosen handle (e.g. name@abdm in production;
name@sbx in sandbox) [S60]. Consent and linking are
addressed to it. |
Store all addresses a user holds. Show which address each record came through. |
| Care context | A provider-side grouping of records (e.g. a visit or an admission) that the HIP links to the user’s ABHA address. In v3 the HI type is declared on the care context [S60]. | Discovery returns care contexts. The UI should show them as “visits”. |
| Discovery and linking | User-initiated: the PHR asks an HIP to find the user’s records (demographic match + OTP); HIP-initiated: the facility links at the point of care; Scan & Share: QR-based registration at a facility [S60] | Build a “Find my records” flow: choose a hospital or lab → OTP → link. Show progress and failures honestly. |
| Consent request | An HIU asks the CM for access with purpose, HI types, date range, expiry/erase date and frequency. The user approves in a PHR/ABHA app. The CM issues consent artifacts per HIP [S1][S4][S60]. | Requests should be narrow by default (purpose-specific, bounded date range, explicit erase date). |
| Purpose codes | Coded purposes, e.g. CAREMGT (care management, seen in
NHA’s reference implementation [S60]); others in ABDM specifications
include BTG (break-the-glass), PUBHLTH,
HPAYMT (healthcare payment), DSRCH
(disease-specific research), PATRQT (self-requested)
⚠ Validate full list in current spec |
Map each product feature to one purpose. Self-access →
PATRQT; doctor-share → CAREMGT; never request
DSRCH without a separate research consent and ethics
approval. |
| Access mode | VIEW, STORE, QUERY,
STREAM [S60] |
Request STORE only where the feature needs persistence
(personal vault). The clinician view should use VIEW. |
| Health-information request and data push | The HIU requests data against a consent artifact with its public key; HIPs encrypt FHIR bundles and push them to the HIU’s data-push URL; HIU acknowledges per care context [S1][S4][S60] | Idempotent, retry-safe ingestion with per-transaction keys; partial-delivery reconciliation. |
| Revocation and expiry | Users can revoke consents from the PHR/ABHA app; artifacts expire | Subscribe to consent notifications; on revoke or expiry, stop fetches and run the erasure workflow. |
| HFR / HPR | Registries of facilities and professionals [S2]; HFR registration is a prerequisite for NHCX participation [S59] | Verify facilities and clinicians on records (“Verified facility” badge). |
| Milestones | M1: ABHA creation, verification, link token. M2: linking and exporting health data (HIP). M3: consent request and importing data (HIU) [S60] | The aggregator needs M1 + M3 (and M2 if it acts as an HIP for user-uploaded records), plus PHR-app flows ⚠ Validate PHR-app certification path. |
| API generation | NHA’s reference implementation moved from V1 to V3
gateway APIs (/api/hiecm/gateway/v3/…,
X-CM-ID: sbx|abdm) in 2024 [S60] |
Build directly on V3. Note that some NHCX docs still reference a
v0.5 sessions endpoint [S59]; confirm with NHA integration
support. |
| Certification | Functional testing, WASA security testing, sandbox exit, production credentials [S59][S4] | Plan security audit and demo as gating items on the critical path. |
5.3 How the aggregator participates: integration modes
| Mode | What it enables | Required milestones | MVP? |
|---|---|---|---|
| PHR app (consumer-facing) | ABHA create/login, discover and link care contexts, approve/deny/revoke consents, self-requested data pull | M1 + PHR-app integration with the CM ⚠ Validate PHR certification requirements | Yes |
| HIU | Consent requests for defined purposes (e.g. a clinician the user authorises; family caregiver flows), receipt of encrypted bundles | M3 | Yes |
| HIP | Re-share user-uploaded documents (as
HealthDocumentRecord) and app-generated wellness data
(WellnessRecord) to other HIUs the user chooses |
M2 | Phase 2 |
| NHCX participant | Eligibility/pre-auth/claim flows | Only as provider/payer/TPA or their tech partner [S59] | Phase 3 (provider SaaS) |
| UHI EUA | Book diagnostics or consultations to close care gaps | UHI onboarding [S13] | Phase 2–3 |
5.4 Consent architecture: two layers, one ledger
The product needs two consent layers recorded in one immutable consent ledger:
- ABDM consent artifacts. These govern records pulled from HIPs. They are issued by the HIE-CM and honoured as-is.
- DPDP platform consents. These govern every other source (documents, devices, manual entry) and every processing purpose (AI summaries, insurance analysis, reminders, research, product improvement). Each must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous, with withdrawal as easy as giving consent [S11]. Notices must meet the content requirements of the DPDP Rules [S12] ⚠ Validate rule-level notice content.
Purpose catalogue (each purpose is a separate toggle; default in brackets)
| Purpose ID | Description | Lawful basis | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
P1 vault_storage |
Store my records and documents | Consent | Required for the core service | Explain storage location (India) and retention |
P2 abdm_self_access |
Fetch my ABDM records (PATRQT/STORE) |
ABDM artifact + consent | Opt-in per HIP | Narrow date range |
P3 clinical_summary |
Generate timeline, summaries, trends, care gaps | Consent | Opt-in (recommended) | Includes AI processing disclosure |
P4 insurance_analysis |
Parse policies, explain coverage, track claims, compute OOP | Consent | Opt-in | |
P5 device_sync |
Read selected Health Connect/HealthKit types | OS permission + consent | Opt-in per data type | |
P6 reminders |
Medicine, test and renewal reminders (push, SMS, WhatsApp) | Consent | Opt-in per channel | WhatsApp opt-in recorded |
P7 doctor_share |
Time-bound share with a named clinician (CAREMGT,
VIEW) |
Consent | Per share | Expiry default 72h (product choice) |
P8 caregiver_access |
A named family member can view/manage | Consent of the person, or verifiable parental consent | Per grant | Scope: view / manage / emergency-only |
P9 mental_wellbeing |
Mood and screener data | Consent | Off | Excluded from P7/P8 unless explicitly included |
P10 product_improvement |
Use de-identified usage and extraction-error data to improve OCR/parsers | Consent | Off | Never raw clinical content without explicit consent |
P11 research |
Contribute de-identified data to approved studies | Consent + ethics approval | Off | Per-study consent [S44] |
P12 offers |
Partner offers (diagnostics, pharmacy) | Consent | Off | Never driven by clinical data without explicit consent; never for minors |
Consent record (internal, DPDP-aligned; corrects the v1.0 object)
{
"consent_id": "cn-2026-001234",
"data_principal_ref": "person:7f3c…",
"granted_by": {"type": "self", "person_ref": "person:7f3c…"},
"purpose_id": "P2_abdm_self_access",
"abdm": {
"consent_request_id": "…",
"consent_artefact_ids": ["…"],
"purpose_code": "PATRQT",
"hi_types": ["DiagnosticReport", "Prescription", "DischargeSummary"],
"access_mode": "STORE",
"date_range": {"from": "2023-01-01", "to": "2026-10-21"},
"data_erase_at": "2027-10-21T00:00:00+05:30",
"frequency": {"unit": "MONTH", "value": 1, "repeats": 0}
},
"sources": ["HIP:hfr-id-…"],
"processing_allowed": ["store", "summarise", "trend", "care_gap"],
"processing_prohibited": ["advertising", "model_training", "sale", "underwriting"],
"notice_version": "notice-v3.2-hi-IN",
"language": "hi-IN",
"channel": "android_app",
"status": "granted",
"created_at": "2026-10-21T19:10:00+05:30",
"withdrawn_at": null,
"evidence_hash": "sha256:…"
}The ABDM
purpose_codeandaccess_modevalues follow NHA’s reference implementation [S60].PATRQTand the frequency unit values must be validated against the current ABDM V3 specification ⚠ Validate.
5.5 Consent UX principles (Indian realities)
- Plain language in the user’s language. Show a one-screen summary covering: who, what data, why, how long and how to withdraw. Offer an expandable full notice. Provide audio read-aloud for low-literacy users. Notices should be available in English and the Eighth Schedule languages where feasible [S12] ⚠ Validate rule requirement.
- No bundling. The core vault must work without AI, insurance or offers consents. No pre-ticked boxes. No “accept all” that hides research or offers. Avoid the dark patterns identified by the CCPA guidelines, such as confirm-shaming, forced action and nagging [S45].
- Assisted consent. A family member may help
an elderly parent, but the parent’s OTP or biometric on their own device
records the grant. The ledger logs
assisted_by. - Consent dashboard. Shows every active consent (ABDM and platform), its expiry, last access and data received, with one-tap withdrawal and an “erase data from this source” option.
- Receipts. Send a consent receipt by in-app inbox (optionally SMS/WhatsApp) for every grant, change or withdrawal.
5.6 Onboarding as an ABDM participant (organisational checklist)
| Step | Activity | Owner | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Incorporate in India; appoint a grievance officer and DPO contact; adopt an ABDM-aligned privacy policy | Legal | [S11][S16] |
| 2 | Apply for ABDM sandbox (V3) registration; obtain client ID/secret | Engineering | [S59][S15] |
| 3 | Build M1 (ABHA), PHR-app flows, M3 (HIU); register bridge/callback URL | Engineering | [S60] |
| 4 | Pass functional test cases; FHIR bundle validation | QA / NRCES | [S59] |
| 5 | WASA security audit (CERT-In empanelled auditor recommended); fix findings | Security | [S59][S20] ⚠ Validate auditor requirement |
| 6 | Sandbox exit; NHA demo; production credentials
(X-CM-ID: abdm) |
Programme | [S59][S60] |
| 7 | Production go-live with monitoring of HIP response rates and failure reasons | SRE / Product | — |
6. Unified Individual Health Graph
6.1 Design principles
- FHIR at the edges, graph at the core. Ingest and export FHIR R4 (NRCES profiles). Internally, keep a typed property graph (or relational + edge tables) tuned for timeline, trend and coverage queries.
- Every fact is an assertion with provenance. A lab value is stored as “Source X asserted HbA1c = 7.1% on date D, extracted with confidence c, verified by V”. It is never stored as bare truth.
- Trust tiers are first-class and are shown in the UI:
| Tier | Label in UI | Definition | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Verified clinical | Received from an identified HIP via ABDM (or a signed partner feed), unchanged | HbA1c in a FHIR DiagnosticReport from a lab HIP |
| T2 | From your document | Extracted from a user-supplied provider document; shows confidence and user confirmation status | HbA1c parsed from a lab PDF on WhatsApp |
| T3 | Measured by your device | From a consumer device via Health Connect/HealthKit/OAuth | Resting heart rate from a smartwatch |
| T4 | Entered by you / your family | Manually entered or self-reported | “Mother has diabetes” |
| T5 | Insight (computed) | Derived by rules or models from T1–T4, with method and inputs listed | “HbA1c has risen across the last two tests” |
| T6 | Reference knowledge | External guidelines, drug knowledge, policy clauses | NP-NCD screening guidance; IRDAI CIS clause |
- Never silently overwrite. Conflicts are preserved and surfaced.
- Consent-scoped by construction. Every node and edge
carries
consent_ids[]. Queries filter by active consent and purpose. - Erasable by design. Per-person, per-source
data-encryption keys allow crypto-shredding on withdrawal or
dataEraseAt.
6.2 Common provenance envelope (on every node)
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
id |
UUID | Internal ID |
person_id |
UUID | Subject (Data Principal or dependent) |
trust_tier |
enum T1–T6 | See table above |
source_type |
enum | abdm_hip, document, device,
manual, partner_api, derived,
reference |
source_ref |
string | HIP/HFR ID, document ID + page + bbox, device/app ID, partner ID |
raw_ref |
URI | Pointer to the encrypted raw FHIR bundle or document blob |
consent_ids |
UUID[] | Consents that authorise holding this node |
abdm_txn_id / care_context_ref |
string | For ABDM-sourced data |
ingested_at, effective_at |
timestamp | Ingestion time vs clinical/observation time |
extraction |
object | {method: ocr+ner|fhir|api, model_version, confidence: 0–1, field_confidences} |
verification |
enum | unverified, user_confirmed,
user_corrected, clinician_confirmed,
source_verified |
corrections[] |
array | Who changed what, when, old/new values |
supersedes / conflicts_with |
UUID[] | Versioning and conflict links |
retention |
object | {policy_id, erase_at, legal_hold: bool} |
language |
BCP-47 | Original document language |
6.3 Entity catalogue
Update-frequency codes: E = event-driven (on ingestion), D = daily sync, C = continuous/near-real-time device sync, M = manual.
A. Identity, family and consent
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Person | name (+ local-script name), DOB/age, sex/gender, mobile, email, preferred language, city/PIN (coarse), blood group | Onboarding, ABHA profile, documents | M / E | ABHA demographics take precedence for name/DOB; mismatch with documents triggers identity check (avoid mixing family members’ records) | person_id; ABHA number (hashed); mobile (hashed) |
| Dependent / Relationship | relationship type, guardian flag, minor flag, date of majority, access scope | Onboarding | M | Minor flag auto-computed from DOB; at age 18, trigger hand-over of control | person_id ↔︎ related_person_id |
| ABHA Identity | ABHA number (encrypted), ABHA address(es), KYC status, linked HIPs | ABDM M1/PHR | E | One ABHA number per person; many addresses allowed; never store Aadhaar number | ABHA number (hashed), ABHA address |
| Consent Record | see §5.4 | Consent service, HIE-CM | E | Immutable append-only; status transitions validated | consent_id, ABDM artifact IDs |
| Caregiver Grant | grantor, grantee, scope (view/manage/emergency), categories excluded (e.g. mental), expiry | Consent service | E | Requires grantor authentication (or verifiable parental consent) | grant ID |
B. Care delivery
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Facility | name, HFR ID, type, address, city, network-hospital flags | HFR, documents | E | Fuzzy-match document facility names to HFR; mark unmatched as “unverified facility” | HFR ID; normalised name + PIN |
| Clinician | name, HPR ID, registration no./council, specialty | HPR, documents | E | Match registration numbers on prescriptions to HPR where possible | HPR ID; registration no. |
| Encounter | type (OP/IP/ER/tele/lab visit), start/end, facility, clinician, reason, care-context ref | ABDM (OPConsultation, DischargeSummary), documents | E | Duplicate rule: same person + facility + encounter class + date (±1 day for IP) → merge candidate | care-context ref; facility + date |
| Diagnosis / Condition | code (ICD-10 / SNOMED CT), text, clinical status, verification status, onset, recorded date, asserter | ABDM, discharge summaries, prescriptions, user | E / M | User-entered conditions stay T4 until corroborated; “rule out”/“?” phrases parsed as provisional, never as confirmed | SNOMED/ICD code + person |
| Symptom | description, onset, severity, duration | User (Q&A), documents | M | Never auto-promote to diagnosis; red-flag terms trigger safety guidance (§9.4) | — |
| Procedure | code, date, facility, outcome | Discharge summaries, claims | E | Link to claim line items | code + date |
| Allergy / Intolerance | substance, reaction, severity, criticality | ABDM, documents, user | E / M | Always shown with source; “no known allergies” stored distinct from “unknown” | substance code |
| Immunization | vaccine, dose number, date, batch, administering facility | ABDM ImmunizationRecord, certificates, cards | E / M | Validate against schedule spacing; flag implausible dates | vaccine code + dose |
C. Medications
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medication (statement/request) | brand, molecule(s), strength, form, dose, route, frequency, duration, start/stop, prescriber, indication | ABDM Prescription, prescription images, discharge summaries | E | Brand→molecule mapping required; unknown brand → “needs confirmation”; duplicate molecule from different brands flagged | molecule code (SNOMED/ATC) + person |
| Medication Dispense | brand, qty, date, pharmacy, price, prescription link | Pharmacy invoices | E | Infer days-supply = qty / daily dose (only when dose known) | invoice ID; molecule |
| Adherence Event | scheduled time, taken/missed/snoozed | App reminders | C / M | Self-reported; label as such | medication ID |
D. Diagnostics, vitals and devices
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lab Result (Observation) | test name (original), LOINC code, value, unit (original + UCUM), lab reference range, flag, specimen, collected/reported time, lab | ABDM DiagnosticReport, lab PDFs | E | Use the lab’s own reference range for flags. Unit conversion only with a known factor. Values outside physiological plausibility → hold for review. | LOINC + collected date + lab |
| Diagnostic Report | panel, report date, performer, result refs, PDF ref, imaging impression (text) | Same | E | Report-level dedup by lab + accession no. + date | accession no. |
| Vital (clinical) | BP, pulse, weight, height, BMI, temperature, SpO2, glucose (with meal context) | ABDM WellnessRecord, documents, devices, manual | E / C / M | Context tags (fasting/post-prandial; seated); device class recorded | LOINC + timestamp |
| Wearable Metric | metric type, value, unit, interval, device/app, aggregation | Health Connect, HealthKit, vendor APIs | C / D | Daily aggregates stored by default (minimisation); raw high-frequency only if a feature needs it; dedupe overlapping sources by priority order | metric + interval + source |
| Activity | steps, active minutes, workouts (type, duration, distance, energy) | Same | D | Prefer the device the user marks as primary | interval |
| Sleep | start/end, duration, stages, interruptions | Same | D | Merge overlapping sessions; flag implausible (>16h) | session interval |
E. Lifestyle and goals
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nutrition Log | meal time, dish (Indian dish DB ID), portion (katori/piece/grams), energy, macros, sodium, sugar, water, supplements | In-app, Health Connect/HealthKit, receipts (opt-in) | M / D | Portion conversion table; dietitian-curated dish DB; receipts give “purchased”, not “consumed” | dish ID + time |
| Wellness Goal | goal type (steps, weight, HbA1c target set by clinician, sleep), target, start, review date, set-by | User, clinician (via share) | M | Clinical targets only when entered by or confirmed with a clinician | goal ID |
| Risk Factor | tobacco, alcohol, activity level, family history, occupation exposure, travel | User questionnaire | M | Time-stamped; re-ask periodically | type |
| Mood Log (opt-in) | score, tags, note (encrypted), screener scores | User | M | Separate key; excluded from AI and sharing by default | — |
F. Insurance and money
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance Policy | insurer, product name, UIN, policy no., type (retail/group/government), policy period, policyholder, insured members, TPA, sum insured, floater flag, renewal date, document refs | Policy schedule, CIS, e-card, (future) payer API / ABHA-policy link | E | Policy no. + insurer unique; group vs retail detection; renewal date sanity | insurer + policy no.; member ID |
| Coverage (benefit) | benefit type (IP, day-care, OPD, maternity, AYUSH, pre/post hospitalisation, ambulance, domiciliary), limit, sub-limit, co-pay %, deductible, room-rent cap, clause ref | Policy wording, CIS | E | Every coverage item must hold a clause_ref (doc + page
+ text span) or it is not shown as fact |
policy ID + benefit code |
| Exclusion | type (permanent, specific, PED), description, code mapping (ICD/procedure where possible), clause ref | Wording, CIS | E | Same clause-ref rule | policy ID + exclusion ID |
| Waiting Period | type (initial, PED, specific disease/procedure, maternity), duration, start date (incl. portability credit), end date | Wording, CIS, user (continuity of cover) | E / M | Compute end dates from the inception date of continuous cover; ask the user to confirm portability history | policy ID + type |
| Premium | amount, due date, paid date, payer, mode, tax-deduction eligibility (information only) | Premium receipts, schedule | E | — | policy ID + period |
| Claim | claim no., type (cashless/reimbursement), member, encounter link, admission/discharge dates, diagnosis, hospital, amount claimed/approved/paid, deductions[], status history, denial reason (text + taxonomy code), TAT | Claim letters, TPA emails, user updates; (future) payer feed | E / M | Status transitions validated; deductions sum check; link to encounter and bills | insurer + claim no. |
| Expense | category (consult, diagnostics, pharmacy, hospitalisation, device, therapy), amount, date, payer (self/insurer/employer), receipt ref | Invoices, bills, claims | E | Avoid double counting: reimbursed amounts offset, not duplicated | receipt ID |
G. Care management
| Entity | Key fields | Source systems | Update | Data-quality rules | Linkage keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Care Gap | rule ID, guideline source, due date, status (due/overdue/done/dismissed), evidence refs, coverage status | Insight engine (T5) + guidelines (T6) | D | Each gap cites rule + guideline + input facts; user can dismiss with reason | rule ID + person |
| Alert / Flag | type (trend, interaction, duplicate therapy, red-flag), severity, message, evidence, acknowledgement | Insight engine | E | Severity thresholds signed off by the clinical safety officer | — |
6.4 Relationships (edge list)
Person -[HAS_IDENTITY]-> ABHAIdentity
Person -[RELATED_TO {type, guardian, scope}]-> Person (Dependent)
Person -[GRANTED]-> ConsentRecord -[COVERS]-> (any node)
Person -[HAD]-> Encounter -[AT]-> Facility ; Encounter -[WITH]-> Clinician
Encounter -[RECORDED]-> Condition | Procedure | Observation | MedicationRequest | Immunization
DiagnosticReport -[CONTAINS]-> Observation(LabResult)
MedicationRequest -[FULFILLED_BY]-> MedicationDispense -[EVIDENCED_BY]-> Expense
Person -[HAS_DEVICE_DATA]-> WearableMetric | Activity | Sleep | Vital
Person -[LOGGED]-> NutritionLog | MoodLog
Person -[INSURED_UNDER {member_id, role}]-> InsurancePolicy
InsurancePolicy -[PROVIDES]-> Coverage ; -[EXCLUDES]-> Exclusion ; -[IMPOSES]-> WaitingPeriod ; -[BILLED_AS]-> Premium
Claim -[UNDER]-> InsurancePolicy ; Claim -[FOR]-> Encounter ; Claim -[SETTLES]-> Expense
CareGap -[DERIVED_FROM]-> (Condition | Observation | RiskFactor | Person.age/sex)
CareGap -[COVERED_BY?]-> Coverage | Exclusion | WaitingPeriod (Coverage-to-Care link)
Alert -[EVIDENCE]-> (any clinical node)
Any node -[SOURCED_FROM]-> SourceArtifact (FHIR bundle | Document page | Device | Manual)
6.5 Data-quality rules
| Situation | Rule | User experience |
|---|---|---|
| Duplicate records (same report via ABDM and PDF) | Match on person + test/LOINC + collected time (±24h) + value (exact)
+ lab; keep T1, link T2 as duplicate_of |
Single entry with “also in your uploaded report” |
| Duplicate encounters | Person + facility (HFR or fuzzy name) + class + date window | Merge suggestion; auto-merge only for T1 + T1 with same care context |
| Conflicting values (same test, same time, different values) | Preserve both; mark conflicts_with; exclude from trend
computation until resolved |
“Two different values found — which is correct?” with both source images |
| Unit mismatch | Convert using a UCUM-validated factor; keep original; if the unit is missing, infer only when the value range is unambiguous, else hold | Shows original and converted |
| Reference-range mismatch across labs | Store per-result range; trend charts show range bands per lab | Note: “Different labs use different normal ranges” |
| Missing data | Distinguish unknown vs negative vs not applicable; care gaps fire only when evidence is absent and the source coverage is adequate | “We don’t have a record of this test — have you done it elsewhere?” |
| OCR/document uncertainty | Field confidence < threshold (e.g. 0.90 for numeric lab values, 0.98 for drug names/doses — thresholds set by clinical safety review) → requires user confirmation; low-confidence data excluded from insights | Side-by-side crop of the source with an editable value |
| Handwritten prescriptions | Never auto-confirm; drug names checked against the brand dictionary; dose/frequency confirmation required | Guided confirmation; option to ask the pharmacist/doctor |
| Identity mismatch (document name ≠ person) | Hold the document; ask “Whose report is this?” (common in family phones) | Assign to the right family member |
| Partial ABDM bundles | Track per-care-context delivery status; retry within consent validity; reconcile | “3 of 4 records received from Hospital X” |
| Revoked/expired consent | Stop processing; remove from views; crypto-shred or delete per retention policy; recompute derived insights without the data | Confirmation with what was deleted |
| Stale data | Last-updated per domain; insights note data age | “Based on reports up to March 2026” |
7. User Journeys and Experience Design
7.1 Design principles for India
| Principle | Practical design |
|---|---|
| Vernacular-first | UI in English + Hindi at launch, then Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, Bengali, Kannada, Gujarati, Malayalam (prioritise by pilot geography). Medical terms are shown with a plain-language gloss (“HbA1c — 3-month average sugar”). Use speech input and read-aloud; consider Bhashini for ASR/TTS/translation [S58] ⚠ Validate API terms. |
| WhatsApp-native ingestion | “Forward reports to our WhatsApp number” (WhatsApp Business
Platform, user-initiated, opt-in recorded); unique email inbox per user
(ravi.k7@inbox.<brand>.in); Android share sheet
target. |
| Paper-to-digital | Camera capture with edge detection, multi-page stitching, glare warnings and offline queueing for poor connectivity. |
| Family-centred | Profile switcher on every screen; colour + photo per family member; “whose report is this?” prompt. |
| Low digital literacy | Large tap targets, icon + text, minimal typing, assisted mode, voice guidance; never more than one decision per screen in consent flows. |
| Low bandwidth / low-end Android | APK size budget; lazy-load charts; on-device caching (encrypted); SMS fallback for OTP and critical reminders. |
| Trust signals | Source badges on every item (Verified clinical / From your document / Device / You entered); “Why am I seeing this?” on every insight. |
| Clinical safety | Emergency banner and helplines available from every screen (§9.4); no diagnosis language. |
7.2 Journey 1: Onboarding and ABHA linking
| Step | User sees / does | System | Consent / safeguard | Failure handling |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Chooses language; sees a 3-card value tour (“records, insurance, family”) | Locale set | — | — |
| 2 | Mobile number + OTP | Account created | Short notice + link to full notice; consent P1 (vault) | OTP retry, SMS fallback, IVR fallback |
| 3 | “Do you have an ABHA?” → Yes: log in with ABHA address/number + OTP · No: create ABHA (Aadhaar or other supported method) · Skip | ABDM M1 / PHR APIs [S59][S60] | Explain what ABHA is and is not (“ABHA links records; it does not store them centrally”) [S1] | Aadhaar OTP failure → alternate method or skip; never block the app |
| 4 | “Find my records”: pick hospitals/labs (search with HFR data; “near me”; recently visited) | Discovery requests to HIPs | Per-HIP opt-in; date range selector (default: last 3 years) | “No records found” → explain likely reasons (name mismatch, facility not ABDM-enabled) + upload option |
| 5 | Approve consent in-app (PHR) | Consent artifact issued; data request; encrypted push | P2 + ABDM artifact (PATRQT, STORE,
explicit erase date) |
Partial delivery tracking |
| 6 | “Add what you have”: upload/forward reports, policy, prescriptions | Document pipeline | P1, P3, P4 shown as separate toggles | Offline queue |
| 7 | Add family members (optional) | Dependent profiles / invites | §7.8 | — |
| 8 | First Snapshot appears (even if partial) | Insight engine | Labels on every item | “We’re still receiving records from 2 hospitals” |
Success metrics: onboarding completion; ABHA link rate; HIP discovery success rate; time-to-first-value (first parsed record).
7.3 Journey 2: Connecting wearables and health apps
- Settings → Connect devices. The list shows “Phone health data (Health Connect / Apple Health)” first, then “Other apps (Oura, Withings, Fitbit…)” in later phases.
- Data-type picker. Steps, sleep, heart rate, weight and BP are pre-selected only if the user’s goals need them. Each type has a one-line “why we need this”. Minimisation applies throughout.
- The OS permission dialog is shown (Health Connect / HealthKit) [S24][S26]. If denied, the app explains how to re-enable it, with no nagging [S45].
- Optional history import (Health Connect requires a separate permission for data older than 30 days before the grant) [S26] ⚠ Validate.
- Background sync schedule. Daily aggregates by default; battery-friendly.
- Source priority. If both watch and phone count steps, the user picks a primary source. Dedup rules apply.
- Device data is labelled “Measured by your device — not a medical test”.
7.4 Journey 3: Uploading an insurance policy and claims
| Step | Detail |
|---|---|
| 1. Add policy | Upload PDF / forward insurer email / photograph the e-card. Select “Personal” or “Employer (group)”. |
| 2. Parse | Policy parser extracts schedule fields + CIS + benefit table + exclusions + waiting periods, each with clause references. |
| 3. Confirm | User confirms insured members (maps to family profiles), inception date of continuous cover (for waiting periods/portability) and TPA. |
| 4. Coverage card | Sum insured · balance (if claims known) · room-rent cap · co-pay · key sub-limits · waiting periods with end dates · top exclusions · renewal date. Every line has “See clause” (opens the PDF at the highlighted span). |
| 5. Add claim | Upload pre-auth letter, discharge bill, settlement or rejection letter; or forward TPA emails. |
| 6. Claim tracker | Timeline: intimation → pre-auth → approval/query → discharge → final approval → settlement; deductions explained line by line (“Non-payable consumables ₹1,840 — Clause 4.2, List I”); denial reason mapped to a taxonomy with suggested next steps (e.g. “insurer’s grievance cell → Insurance Ombudsman”, information only) [S18] ⚠ Validate grievance path wording. |
| 7. Spend | Claims feed into the OOP spend view (claimed vs paid vs self-paid). |
Guardrail: coverage answers are informational interpretations of the policy document, not a guarantee of claim admissibility. Show this label on every answer. Never recommend buying, switching or upgrading a policy unless the IRDAI licensing question is resolved (§9.6).
7.5 Journey 4: Uploading lab reports and prescriptions
- User shares a PDF/photo (in-app, WhatsApp-forward, email-forward, share sheet).
- Classification. Document type (lab report, prescription, discharge summary, bill, policy, other), person match (name/age/sex vs family profiles) and language.
- Extraction.
- Lab report: test rows → name, value, unit, range, flag → LOINC mapping.
- Prescription: drug lines → brand → molecule, strength, dose, frequency, duration; doctor name/registration → HPR lookup.
- Confidence routing.
- High confidence: auto-accepted as T2 “unconfirmed”.
- Below threshold: “Please check these 3 values”, with crops of the original.
- Handwritten drug lines always need confirmation.
- Results.
- The timeline is updated.
- Trend charts are updated (only confirmed or high-confidence values).
- The medicine list is updated and duplicate-molecule check runs.
- A refill estimate is set if quantity is known.
- Explain. Plain-language explanation of each test (reference knowledge, T6). Values outside the lab’s range are marked “outside the lab’s reference range” with “Discuss with your doctor”. There is no interpretation of what the abnormality means for the individual.
7.6 Journey 5: Generating a “Health Financial + Clinical Snapshot”
A single shareable page (in-app, PDF export, and a time-bound doctor-share link) with these sections:
| Section | Content | Tier labels |
|---|---|---|
| Header | Name, age, sex, blood group, ABHA address (masked), emergency contact, last updated | T4/T1 |
| Active conditions | Each condition with first-recorded date and source | T1/T2/T4 |
| Current medicines | Molecule + brand, dose, frequency, prescriber, last dispensed; duplicate-molecule flags | T1/T2/T4 |
| Allergies | Substance + reaction + source; “unknown” vs “none” | T1/T2/T4 |
| Recent key results | Last 3 values for condition-relevant tests (e.g. HbA1c, fasting glucose, lipids, creatinine/eGFR, TSH, Hb) with lab ranges and trend arrows | T1/T2 |
| Vitals & lifestyle | 30/90-day BP average (if home readings), weight trend, steps, sleep | T3/T4 |
| Vaccinations & care gaps | Due/overdue items with guideline source | T5/T6 |
| Hospitalisations & procedures | Dates, facility, discharge diagnosis | T1/T2 |
| Insurance | Policies, sum insured, balance, waiting periods ending soon, key exclusions, renewal dates | T2 |
| Spend (12 months) | Consultations, diagnostics, pharmacy, hospitalisation; reimbursed vs out-of-pocket | T2/T5 |
| Data coverage | “Sources included: 2 hospitals (ABDM), 14 uploaded documents, Health Connect. Not included: …” | — |
| Disclaimer | “Summary of your records for information. Not a diagnosis. Verify with your clinician.” | — |
7.7 Journey 6: Asking questions (conversational assistant)
The assistant uses retrieval over the user’s consented graph only. It answers with citations to source items, labels trust tiers, and refuses or redirects out-of-scope clinical questions. Templates for the five reference questions:
Q1. “What are my recurring health costs?”
In the last 12 months you spent ₹38,420 on health. ₹24,100 went to medicines (mostly 3 monthly refills: metformin + glimepiride, atorvastatin, telmisartan) and ₹6,800 to diagnostics (4 lab visits). Your insurer reimbursed ₹0 of this, because your policy does not cover OPD expenses (Policy clause 3.1, see clause). Recurring monthly average: ≈ ₹2,000 for medicines. Sources: 11 pharmacy invoices, 4 lab bills, policy wording. Amounts from documents — please check any marked “unconfirmed”.
Q2. “Am I covered for this procedure?” (e.g. cataract surgery)
Based on your policy document (Insurer X, “Plan Y”, policy no. …1234): • Cataract surgery is listed under day-care procedures (Annexure II, see clause). • There is a specific waiting period of 24 months for cataract (Clause 4.2.b). Your continuous cover started 15 Mar 2025, so this waiting period ends on 15 Mar 2027 (computed). • A sub-limit of ₹40,000 per eye applies (Schedule, see clause). • Planned surgery usually needs pre-authorisation from your TPA (Medi Assist) at a network hospital for cashless treatment. Expected out-of-pocket (estimate): any cost above the sub-limit + non-payable items. This is an interpretation of your policy document, not a claim decision. Confirm with your insurer/TPA before admission.
Q3. “What preventive tests are due?”
For a 52-year-old woman with type 2 diabetes recorded: • HbA1c — last done 10 Sep 2026; commonly repeated every 3–6 months as advised by your doctor → next due around Dec 2026–Mar 2027 (guideline, T6). • Kidney function and urine albumin — no record found in your data. • Eye (retina) check — no record found. • Cervical and breast cancer screening — population screening for women 30+ is offered under the national NCD programme (NP-NCD) [S37]; no record found. • Blood pressure — home readings in the last 30 days: average 136/86 (device). Coverage note: preventive health check up to ₹5,000 every 2 policy years under your policy (see clause). These are reminders based on general guidelines and your records. Your doctor may advise differently. [Book with your doctor] [Mark as done elsewhere]
Q4. “How is my diabetes trend changing?”
HbA1c: 6.4% (12 Jan 2026, Lab A, verified clinical) → 6.9% (20 May 2026, Lab B, from your document) → 7.1% (10 Sep 2026, Lab A, verified clinical). The values have risen across your last three tests. The lab’s reference range is shown on the chart. Fasting glucose (home meter): 30-day average 138 mg/dL vs 124 mg/dL three months ago (device/self-entered). Context you logged: average steps fell from ~7,500 to ~4,200/day over the same period (device). Discuss these trends with your doctor. This is not a diagnosis or a treatment recommendation. [Share summary with my doctor]
Q5. “Which claims were rejected and why?”
1 of 3 claims in the last 2 years was rejected: Claim …778 (reimbursement, Oct 2025, ₹18,600). Reason stated in the TPA letter: “Treatment for condition within the 2-year specific-disease waiting period” → taxonomy: Waiting period. 1 claim was partially approved: ₹6,240 deducted (₹3,900 room-rent proportionate deduction; ₹2,340 non-payable consumables). What you can do (information): request the detailed reasoning from the insurer; use the insurer’s grievance process; if unresolved, the Insurance Ombudsman route is available [S18] ⚠ Validate. Sources: 2 TPA letters, 1 settlement advice.
Assistant refusal and redirect patterns
| User asks | Response pattern |
|---|---|
| “Do I have diabetes?” | Shows recorded diagnoses and relevant results with sources; “Only a doctor can diagnose. Here’s a summary you can share.” |
| “Should I stop my BP tablet?” | “Please don’t change medicines without your doctor’s advice.” Offers doctor-share; no dosing advice. |
| “I have chest pain now” | Emergency interrupt (§9.4): call 112 / nearest emergency; no further chat until acknowledged. |
| “Which policy should I buy?” | Information on own-policy gaps only; no product recommendation (licensing). |
7.8 Journey 7: Family-member view with separate consent
| Scenario | Flow | Consent rule |
|---|---|---|
| Child (<18) | Parent creates profile → verifiable parental consent captured [S11][S12] → child’s records, vaccinations, growth | No behavioural tracking or targeted ads for children [S11]. At 18: notify and transfer control; the parent loses access unless the new adult re-grants. |
| Elderly parent with own phone | Caregiver sends invite → parent opens link, chooses language, consents with OTP → selects scope for the caregiver: view, manage (upload, reminders), emergency-only | Parent can revoke at any time; the activity log is visible to the parent. |
| Elderly parent without a smartphone | Assisted consent: caregiver initiates; parent’s OTP on a basic phone or in-person confirmation; IVR read-out of notice in local language | assisted_by recorded. Periodic re-confirmation.
⚠ Validate legal sufficiency with counsel. |
| Adult lacking capacity | Lawful guardian flow per DPDP Rules for persons with disability [S12] | Guardian documentation verified ⚠ Validate |
| Spouse | Each adult has their own account; mutual sharing only by explicit grant | No default spouse access. |
| Sensitive categories | Mental wellbeing, sexual/reproductive health, HIV, and others the user tags as private are excluded from caregiver views by default | The person can include them explicitly. |
7.9 Journey 8: Consent withdrawal and data deletion
- Consent dashboard → select a consent (e.g. “Hospital X records”, “AI summaries”, “Health Connect”) → Withdraw.
- Show consequences in plain language: what stops, and what will be deleted. Offer “Download my data first” (FHIR bundle + PDFs + CSV).
- Execute:
- ABDM: revoke via CM (or reflect revocation initiated in the ABHA app); stop pulls; erase data held under that artifact.
- Platform: stop processing for that purpose.
- Devices: revoke OS permission guidance + stop reads.
- Erasure:
- Delete or crypto-shred raw and normalised data from that source.
- Recompute derived insights.
- Purge from search indexes, caches and analytics stores.
- Schedule backup expiry (backups age out within a defined window; restored backups re-apply the deletion ledger).
- Exceptions disclosed. Data retained under legal obligation, e.g. transaction/billing records for tax law, and logs required by DPDP Rules / CERT-In for the prescribed period [S12][S20], is kept minimal and access-restricted.
- Receipt. Confirmation of what was deleted, with a reference number. The grievance officer’s contact is shown [S11].
- Account deletion. The same flow covers all data. Dependent profiles must be transferred or deleted first.
8. Insight and Summary Engine
8.1 Architecture of insights
Graph (consent-filtered view)
│
├── Deterministic rules engine (care gaps, waiting-period math, OOP, refill dates, duplicate molecule)
├── Statistical trend module (direction, rate, variability; no prediction in MVP)
├── Knowledge services (T6) (guidelines, drug knowledge, policy clauses, test explanations)
└── LLM layer (constrained) (summarise, explain, translate, answer Qs — ONLY over retrieved facts)
│
└── Safety filter → Citation checker → Tier labeller → UI
- Rules first, LLM last. Any number, date, eligibility or flag comes from deterministic code with unit tests. The LLM only phrases and translates those outputs. Every sentence it produces must map to a retrieved fact or rule output (citation checker); sentences without support are dropped.
- Clinical content governance. A named clinical safety officer approves every rule, threshold and message template; content is version-controlled; changes go through a hazard log (§9.4).
8.2 Capability specifications
| Capability | Inputs | Logic | Output example | Label & guardrail |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health timeline | Encounters, conditions, procedures, meds, labs, claims | Chronological merge; group by episode (admission ± related tests/claims) | “Mar 2026 — Admitted, City Hospital, 3 days: dengue fever (discharge summary). Claim approved ₹42,300.” | Source badge on every event |
| Clinical summary | Active conditions, meds, allergies, immunizations, latest results | Active = clinical status active or recent med/test evidence; “unverified” section for T4-only | See Snapshot §7.6 | No new diagnoses inferred; “possible” items listed as “mentioned in documents” |
| Abnormal value highlighting | Lab results + lab reference range | Outside lab range → mark; repeated outside range → “repeatedly outside range” | “LDL 168 mg/dL — above the lab’s reference range” | No severity grading for the individual in MVP (clinician-reviewed critical-value list only triggers “contact your doctor promptly”) |
| Trends | Time series (≥3 points) | Direction via simple regression; change vs prior; variability (BP SD) | “HbA1c has risen across your last 3 tests” | Never “your diabetes is worsening”; wording approved by the clinical safety officer |
| Fitness & lifestyle summary | Steps, active minutes, sleep, weight, nutrition logs, goals | Weekly/monthly aggregates vs user goals; streaks | “You averaged 6,100 steps (goal 8,000) and 6h 10m sleep this month” | Device-measured label; goals user- or clinician-set |
| Preventive-care plan | Age, sex, conditions, risk factors, last test dates; guideline rules (T6) | Rule library sourced from Indian programmes (NP-NCD screening for 30+, UIP for children) [S37][S38] and clinician-approved chronic-care monitoring intervals ⚠ Validate guideline citations | “Cervical cancer screening: no record found” | “General guideline — your doctor may advise differently”; user can dismiss |
| Medication intelligence | Med list, dispenses, adherence logs | MVP: duplicate-molecule detection, refill-due estimate, adherence summary. Phase 2: licensed DDI checks filtered to clinically significant severity | “Two of your medicines contain the same ingredient (paracetamol)” | “Check with your doctor or pharmacist” — never “stop” |
| Insurance summary | Policy, coverage, exclusions, waiting periods, claims | Clause-cited extraction; waiting-period end dates; sum-insured consumption; renewal reminders | “PED waiting period ends 15 Mar 2027” | “Interpretation of your policy document, not a claim decision” |
| Coverage-to-Care gap | Care gaps × coverage/exclusions/waiting periods × network | Join a recommended service to benefit clauses | “Retina check due · OPD not covered · est. ₹800–1,500 out-of-pocket (estimate)” | Estimates shown as ranges with basis |
| Health spend analytics | Expenses, claims, premiums | Category totals; reimbursed vs OOP; recurring detection; annual premium vs claims | “Net OOP in FY 2025-26: ₹52,300 (excluding premiums)” | Amounts from documents; information only, no tax advice |
| Claim analytics | Claims, letters | Status history, TAT, deduction categories, denial taxonomy | “Room-rent proportionate deduction caused 63% of your deductions” | Information only |
| Risk flags | Rule triggers (critical values, red-flag symptoms, dangerous combinations) | Clinician-approved rules with severity levels | “Your report shows a value the lab marked critical. Contact your doctor today.” | Informational; escalation path; logged |
8.3 Care-gap rule library: structure
rule_id: CG-DM-UACR-01
title: "Urine albumin (kidney check) for people with diabetes"
applies_if:
condition_any: [SNOMED:44054006] # Type 2 diabetes mellitus
evidence_of_completion:
loinc_any: ["14959-1", "9318-7"] # microalbumin / albumin-creatinine ratio (validate codes)
interval_months: 12 # set by clinical governance
guideline_ref: "Clinician-approved, aligned to national/Indian society guidance (cite)"
message_key: cg.dm.uacr.due
coverage_lookup: [benefit:OPD, benefit:annual_health_check]
severity: reminder
owner: clinical_safety_officer
version: 1.2The LOINC and SNOMED codes above are illustrative. They must be validated by the clinical informatics lead against current LOINC/SNOMED CT releases and NRCES value sets [S6][S50].
8.4 Explainability standard (every insight)
Each insight card must show:
- What: the statement.
- Based on: linked source items, with tier badges.
- How: the rule or method in plain words.
- Confidence / limitations: missing sources, unconfirmed values.
- What you can do: a non-directive action (discuss with doctor, book test, check policy clause).
- Feedback: “Is this wrong?”, which feeds the correction workflow.
Example (corrected from v1.0):
HbA1c trend. Your HbA1c was 6.4% on 12 Jan 2026 and 7.1% on 10 Sep 2026 (both from Lab A, verified clinical). Both values are above the lab’s reference range (4.0–5.6%), and the later value is higher. Method: comparison of your two most recent lab results. Limitation: results from other labs may not be included. Please discuss this trend with your doctor; this is not a diagnosis.
9. Trust, Safety, Privacy, and Compliance
Legal-advice flag. This section maps obligations for product design. It is not legal advice. Engage Indian counsel with DPDP, health-regulatory and insurance expertise before launch, and obtain written opinions on the items marked ⚖ Opinion required.
9.1 Regulatory map
| Regime | Applies to this product because… | Key obligations / risks | Status / validation |
|---|---|---|---|
| DPDP Act, 2023 [S11] | The company processes digital personal data (including health data) of Data Principals in India | Notice; consent or legitimate use; purpose limitation; accuracy; reasonable security safeguards; breach intimation; erasure; children’s data; grievance redressal; Data Principal rights (access, correction, erasure, nomination); penalties up to ₹250 crore for failure to take reasonable security safeguards [S11] | Act in force in phases via the Rules |
| DPDP Rules, 2025 [S12] | Operational detail for the Act | Notice content; Consent Manager registration; breach intimation to each affected person and to the Board (detailed report within 72 hours, as understood); reasonable security safeguards (encryption/masking/tokenisation, access control, logging and monitoring, backups); log retention of at least one year; verifiable parental consent; exemptions for healthcare professionals/clinical establishments in specified cases; Significant Data Fiduciary duties | Notified November 2025; phased commencement, with most fiduciary obligations ~18 months after notification ⚠ Validate exact dates and rule numbers |
| ABDM Health Data Management Policy [S16] and ABDM participation terms | The product participates as PHR/HIU (and HIP) | Consent per ABDM artifact; purpose limitation; erasure at
dataEraseAt; security standards; audit; no use beyond
consent ⚠ Validate latest HDM Policy version and HIU storage
rules |
Condition of ABDM integration |
| CERT-In Directions (28 April 2022) [S20] | The company is a body corporate / service provider operating IT systems in India | Report specified cyber incidents to CERT-In within 6 hours; maintain ICT logs for 180 days within India; synchronise clocks to NTP sources designated by NIC/NPL | In force ⚠ Validate any amendments |
| IT Act 2000 s.43A / SPDI Rules 2011 | Health data is “sensitive personal data” under the SPDI Rules | Reasonable security practices (e.g. ISO 27001-type), consent, disclosure limits | Continue until DPDP provisions replace them (the DPDP Act omits s.43A on commencement) ⚠ Validate commencement |
| Telemedicine Practice Guidelines 2020 [S21] | If the product connects users to doctors or enables tele-consults | Only registered medical practitioners may consult; platforms must verify RMPs; AI/ML platforms may not counsel patients or prescribe | Applies to any tele-consult feature; shapes the AI assistant’s scope |
| Medical Devices Rules 2017 / CDSCO [S22] | Software intended for diagnosis, monitoring or treatment may fall within the medical-device definition | Risk classification, licensing, quality management (ISO 13485), clinical evaluation | ⚖ Opinion required on whether risk flags, interaction alerts or trend scoring are SaMD; design MVP to stay “informational” |
| Mental Healthcare Act 2017 [S23] | Optional mental-wellbeing features | Right to confidentiality of mental-health information | Design: separate consent, exclusion from sharing by default |
| IRDAI regulations [S18][S19][S47] | Insurance explainers, claim assistance, any renewal/recommendation | Product and policyholder-protection norms (CIS, claim timelines); intermediary registration if soliciting/recommending/selling insurance | ⚖ Opinion required before any “renew/compare/buy” feature |
| Consumer Protection Act 2019, E-Commerce Rules 2020, CCPA Dark Patterns Guidelines 2023 [S45] | Consumer-facing subscription app | Fair pricing disclosure; easy cancellation; no dark patterns (false urgency, basket sneaking, confirm-shaming, forced action, subscription traps, nagging, etc.) | Applies to consent and subscription UX |
| Drugs and Cosmetics Act/Rules; Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act | Pharmacy referrals; health claims in marketing | No facilitation of unlawful sale of prescription drugs; no prohibited health advertising claims | Relevant to marketplace features |
| Clinical Establishments Act 2010 | Only if the company itself provides clinical services | Registration under state adoption | Likely not applicable to a data platform ⚠ Validate per state |
| ICMR Ethical Guidelines for AI in Biomedical Research and Healthcare (2023) [S44] | AI features; any research use | Autonomy, safety, data privacy, accountability, transparency, ethics-committee oversight for research | Adopt as governance baseline |
9.2 DPDP obligations translated into product controls
| DPDP principle | Product control | Owner | Evidence artefact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notice (s.5) | Layered, multilingual notice per purpose; versioned | Legal + Design | Notice registry with hashes |
| Consent (s.6) | Purpose catalogue (§5.4), granular toggles, consent ledger, withdrawal as easy as grant | Product + Eng | Consent ledger; UX test records |
| Legitimate uses (s.7) | Narrow use, e.g. a medical emergency basis for showing emergency info; do not stretch it to cover analytics | Legal | Basis register per processing activity |
| Accuracy (s.8(3)) | Correction workflow; conflict surfacing; source display | Product | Correction logs |
| Security safeguards (s.8(5)) | Controls in §9.3 | Security | ISMS, pen-test reports |
| Breach intimation (s.8(6)) | Incident runbook (§9.5) | Security + Legal | Incident register |
| Erasure (s.8(7)) | Retention schedule + crypto-shredding | Eng | Deletion ledger |
| Grievance (s.8(10), s.13) | In-app grievance with SLA tracking; published grievance officer | Support | Ticket metrics |
| Children (s.9) | Verifiable parental consent; no tracking/behavioural monitoring/targeted ads for children | Product + Legal | VPC records |
| Rights (s.11–14) | Self-serve access/export (FHIR + PDF), correction, erasure, nomination of a person to exercise rights on death/incapacity | Product | Rights-request logs |
| Significant Data Fiduciary (s.10) | Prepare for possible notification as SDF (large volumes of sensitive health data): DPO in India, periodic DPIA, independent audit | Legal | DPIA, audit reports ⚖ Opinion required |
| Cross-border transfer (s.16) | Host in India; restrict vendors (LLM/OCR) to India regions or contractually controlled processing; monitor any government restriction list | Eng + Legal | Data-flow map; vendor register |
9.3 Security architecture controls
| Control area | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Data classification | C4: raw clinical documents, FHIR bundles, mental-health data, identifiers (ABHA number, policy numbers). C3: normalised clinical/insurance graph. C2: derived insights. C1: de-identified aggregates. |
| Encryption | TLS 1.2+ (1.3 preferred) in transit; AES-256 at rest; envelope encryption with per-person, per-source data keys in a cloud KMS/HSM (India region); ABDM transfers via per-request ECDH Curve25519 key pairs [S60]; mental-health data under a separate key hierarchy. |
| Crypto-shredding | Erasure of a source = destroy its data key; backups become unreadable for that scope. |
| Identity & access | Customer: OTP + device binding + optional biometric app lock. Workforce: SSO + MFA + just-in-time privileged access; no standing human access to C4 data; break-glass with dual approval and logging. |
| Authorisation | Attribute-based access control:
subject × purpose × consent × data category; enforced in a
central policy engine (e.g. OPA-style) on every API, export and
analytics job. |
| Tokenisation / masking | ABHA number, Aadhaar-linked fields (never store the Aadhaar number), policy numbers, mobile numbers tokenised; masked in logs, support tools and analytics. |
| Audit | Immutable, append-only audit log (WORM storage) of consent, access, disclosure, export, correction, revocation and deletion events; user-visible access log. |
| Logging & monitoring | SIEM; anomaly detection on bulk access; log retention ≥ 180 days in India (CERT-In) and ≥ 1 year where DPDP Rules require [S12][S20]; time sync to designated NTP. |
| Application security | Secure SDLC; SAST/DAST; dependency scanning; mobile app hardening (root/jailbreak detection, certificate pinning, encrypted local storage); OWASP MASVS alignment; annual third-party pen test + ABDM WASA [S59]. |
| Vendor governance | DPDP-aligned processing agreements; sub-processor register; security assessment; data-residency clauses; no-training clauses for LLM/OCR vendors; deletion SLAs. |
| Resilience | Multi-AZ in an India region; encrypted backups with tested restore; RPO/RTO targets; DR in a second India region. |
| Certifications (target) | ISO/IEC 27001 and 27701; SOC 2 Type II for B2B buyers (optional). |
9.4 Clinical safety framework
| Element | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Clinical safety officer | Named, registered medical practitioner accountable for clinical content, rules and thresholds |
| Hazard log | Identify hazards (e.g. misread drug dose, missed critical value, false reassurance, outdated guideline, wrong-person record), assess severity × likelihood, define mitigations, track residual risk |
| Intended-use statement | “Information and organisation of personal health records; general wellness and preventive reminders; not for diagnosis or treatment decisions.” Supports the SaMD position ⚖ Opinion required |
| Language rules | Approved verbs: shows, recorded, outside the lab’s range, has risen, is due, discuss. Prohibited: you have, diagnosis, you should take/stop, safe, normal for you, cured |
| Critical values | Clinician-approved list of lab-flagged critical values → prominent “contact your doctor today / seek care” message; no attempt at interpretation |
| Red-flag symptoms | When a user types symptoms such as chest pain, breathlessness, stroke signs, severe bleeding, suicidal thoughts or loss of consciousness: emergency interrupt with 112 (national emergency), 108 (ambulance, in most states), and Tele-MANAS 14416 for mental-health support [S39] ⚠ Validate all numbers per state before release |
| No delayed care by design | The app never says “no need to see a doctor”; absence of data is never presented as absence of disease |
| Human review | High-risk outputs (critical values, interaction alerts at “major” severity) can be routed to a clinician-review queue in premium tiers |
| Post-market surveillance | Track user-reported errors, near-misses and complaints; monthly safety review; incident reporting process |
9.5 Breach response runbook (summary)
| Phase | Actions | Clock |
|---|---|---|
| Detect & triage | SIEM alert / report → incident commander; severity classification | T0 |
| Contain | Revoke credentials/keys; isolate systems; preserve evidence | ASAP |
| Report to CERT-In | Reportable incident types | Within 6 hours of noticing [S20] |
| Intimate Data Protection Board | Initial intimation without delay; detailed report (facts, cause, mitigation, affected persons) | Within 72 hours (or as extended by the Board) per DPDP Rules [S12] ⚠ Validate |
| Notify affected Data Principals | Plain-language notice: nature, extent, likely consequences, mitigation, steps to protect themselves, contact | Without delay [S12] |
| Notify ABDM / partners | Per ABDM and partner agreements | As contracted ⚠ Validate ABDM reporting requirement |
| Remediate & review | Root cause; fixes; lessons learned; update hazard log/DPIA | Post-incident |
9.6 Insurance-related compliance boundaries
| Feature | Risk level | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Show the user’s own policy terms, waiting periods, exclusions (from their document) | Low | Information service; label as interpretation; cite clauses |
| Claim tracker and deduction explainer | Low–Medium | Information; no representation before insurer on user’s behalf in MVP |
| Claim assistance (filing on the user’s behalf, follow-up with TPA) | Medium | Check whether this constitutes an intermediary activity or claims consultancy requiring authorisation ⚖ Opinion required |
| “Your cover may be inadequate” (coverage adequacy) | Medium | Information about own policy only; no product suggestion |
| Compare/recommend/sell/renew policies; earn commission | High | Requires IRDAI registration (e.g. corporate agent, web aggregator, broker) or partnership with a registered intermediary with clear disclosures [S47] ⚖ Opinion required |
| Share user data with insurers for underwriting | High | Not in roadmap. If ever considered: separate explicit consent, no penalty for refusal, legal review, and no use of data obtained for care purposes |
9.7 Responsible AI controls
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Consent-aware retrieval | The LLM context only receives facts from consents covering the
clinical_summary / insurance_analysis
purposes |
| Minimisation & redaction | Direct identifiers (name, ABHA, phone, policy number, addresses) removed or pseudonymised before model calls; full histories never sent by default |
| Model hosting | Prefer models hosted in India regions or self-hosted; contractual no-retention / no-training; logs within India ⚠ Validate vendor region availability |
| Grounding & citation | Every generated sentence linked to a fact ID or rule output; unsupported sentences dropped; numbers copied from structured fields, never generated |
| Safety filters | Red-flag detection before generation; prohibited-language filter after generation |
| Evaluation | Golden test sets in English and Indian languages (lab explanations, policy Q&A, refusals); hallucination rate, citation accuracy and refusal correctness tracked per release; clinician review of samples |
| Auditability | Store prompt template version, retrieved fact IDs, model version, output, and safety-filter results per response (retained per audit policy, access-restricted) |
| Transparency | “AI-generated summary” label; “How this was made” link; easy error reporting |
| Low-confidence data | Excluded from AI context unless user-confirmed |
10. Technical Architecture
10.1 Logical architecture
┌──────────────────────── Channels ───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Android app (primary) · iOS app · Web (caregiver) · WhatsApp inbound · Email inbound │
└───────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ (mTLS / OAuth2, device binding)
┌────────▼─────────┐
│ API Gateway/BFF │──── Policy Decision Point (consent × purpose × role)
└────────┬─────────┘
┌─────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ │ Core services │
│ Identity & ABHA svc ── ABDM Gateway (V3) / HIE-CM ── HIPs │
│ Consent svc + Consent Ledger (append-only) │
│ HIU Data-flow svc (data-push endpoint, ECDH decrypt, ack, reconcile) │
│ Document Ingestion svc (upload, WA, email) → Document AI pipeline │
│ Device Sync svc (Health Connect/HealthKit on-device → batched upload) │
│ Partner Connectors (OAuth vendors; payer/TPA/employer feeds — later) │
│ Canonicalisation svc (FHIR R4 ⇄ Health Graph; terminology mapping) │
│ Health Graph store + Timeline/Query API │
│ Insight Engine (rules, trends, care gaps, coverage, spend) │
│ AI Gateway (redaction, grounding, safety filters, audit) │
│ Notification svc (push, SMS, WhatsApp templates) │
│ Sharing svc (time-bound doctor links; FHIR export) │
│ Erasure & Retention svc (crypto-shred, purge, recompute) │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────── Data plane (India region) ─────────────────────┐
│ Raw vault (encrypted blobs: FHIR bundles, PDFs, images) │
│ FHIR store (canonical clinical/insurance resources) │
│ Graph/relational store (person-partitioned) · Search index (per-person) │
│ Time-series store (device metrics, daily aggregates) │
│ Audit log (WORM) · KMS/HSM (per-person/per-source keys) │
│ De-identified analytics warehouse (consented P10/P11 only) │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
10.2 ABDM HIU / PHR data flow (corrected sequence)
User (PHR UI) Aggregator (HIU) ABDM Gateway/CM HIP
│ select HIPs, range │ │ │
│──────────────────▶ │ consent request (purpose, │ │
│ │ hiTypes, permission)──────▶│ │
│ │◀───── ack (request id) ────│ │
│◀─ consent prompt (in PHR/ABHA app) ─────────────│ │
│── approve ─────────────────────────────────────▶│ │
│ │◀─ consent notify (async callback: GRANTED, │
│ │ artefact ids) ───────────│ │
│ │── fetch artefact ─────────▶│ │
│ │◀─ artefact (async) ────────│ │
│ │── HI request (artefact id, │ │
│ │ dateRange, dataPushUrl, │ │
│ │ keyMaterial: ECDH │ │
│ │ Curve25519 pubkey+nonce)▶│── HI request ─────▶│
│ │◀─ txn id (async) ──────────│ │
│ │◀═══ encrypted FHIR bundles pushed to dataPushUrl ═│
│ │── decrypt (ECDH → HKDF → AES-GCM), validate, │
│ │ store raw, canonicalise, ack per care context ─▶ (notify)
│◀─ "3 of 4 records received" ─│ │ │
│ │ on revoke/expiry/dataEraseAt: stop + erase │
Notes:
- Every ABDM interaction is asynchronous (request →
on-callback). Implement idempotency keys (REQUEST-ID), timestamps and retries [S60]. - Use V3 gateway endpoints with
X-CM-ID=sbx(sandbox) orabdm(production) [S60]. - Generate a new key pair per HI request. Store private keys only in memory/KMS for the life of the transaction.
10.3 HIU integration pseudocode (corrected for async consent)
# 1. Create consent request (purpose codes per ABDM; validate against current spec)
req_id = abdm.consent_requests.init(
patient_abha_address=person.abha_address,
purpose_code="PATRQT", # self-requested (validate); CAREMGT for doctor-share
hi_types=["DiagnosticReport", "Prescription", "DischargeSummary", "OPConsultation"],
hips=selected_hip_ids,
permission={
"accessMode": "STORE",
"dateRange": {"from": "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z", "to": "2026-10-21T00:00:00Z"},
"dataEraseAt": "2027-10-21T00:00:00Z",
"frequency": {"unit": "HOUR", "value": 1, "repeats": 0},
},
)
ledger.record_pending(person.id, req_id, purpose="P2_abdm_self_access")
# 2. Asynchronous callback when the user approves or denies in the PHR/ABHA app
@callback("/v3/hiu/consent/request/notify")
def on_consent_notify(evt):
verify_gateway_signature(evt)
ledger.update_status(evt.consent_request_id, evt.status) # GRANTED / DENIED / REVOKED / EXPIRED
if evt.status == "GRANTED":
for artefact_id in evt.consent_artefact_ids:
abdm.consents.fetch(artefact_id) # result arrives via on-fetch callback
elif evt.status in ("REVOKED", "EXPIRED"):
erasure.schedule(scope=evt.consent_artefact_ids)
@callback("/v3/hiu/consents/on-fetch")
def on_artefact(evt):
artefact = evt.consent
ledger.attach_artefact(artefact)
keys = crypto.new_x25519_keypair() # per request; never reused
kms.hold_ephemeral(artefact.id, keys.private)
abdm.health_information.request(
consent_id=artefact.id,
date_range=artefact.permission.dateRange,
data_push_url=settings.DATA_PUSH_URL,
key_material=keys.public_material(nonce=crypto.nonce32()),
)
# 3. HIP pushes encrypted bundles to the data-push endpoint
@endpoint("/data/push", idempotent_on="transactionId+careContextReference")
def on_data_push(payload):
priv = kms.get_ephemeral(payload.consent_id)
for entry in payload.entries:
bundle = crypto.decrypt_abdm(entry.content, priv, payload.keyMaterial) # ECDH -> HKDF -> AES-GCM
raw_ref = vault.put_encrypted(bundle, person_key(payload))
result = fhir.validate(bundle, profiles="NRCES")
nodes = canonicalise(bundle, provenance={
"consent_id": payload.consent_id, "txn_id": payload.transactionId,
"source": payload.hip_id, "raw_ref": raw_ref, "trust_tier": "T1"})
graph.upsert(nodes, dedupe=True)
abdm.health_information.notify(payload.transactionId, status="TRANSFERRED")
insights.recompute(person=payload.person_id)10.4 Document AI pipeline
| Stage | Function | Build / buy note |
|---|---|---|
| Intake | Virus scan, file type check, page split, de-duplication by hash | Build |
| Pre-processing | De-skew, de-noise, glare detection, orientation | Buy/OSS |
| OCR | Printed English + major Indian scripts; handwriting (low confidence) | Buy/partner (evaluate India-region availability and accuracy on Indian lab/pharmacy layouts) |
| Classification | Lab / prescription / discharge / bill / policy / CIS / claim letter / e-card / other | Build (fine-tuned on own labelled data, with consent P10 or synthetic data) |
| Layout & table extraction | Lab tables, bill line items, benefit tables | Build + OSS |
| Clinical NER & normalisation | Tests → LOINC, drugs → molecule/SNOMED, diagnoses → SNOMED/ICD-10, units → UCUM | Build on licensed terminology + Indian drug dictionary |
| Policy clause extraction | Benefits, limits, exclusions, waiting periods with spans | Build (core IP) |
| Confidence scoring | Field-level calibrated confidence | Build |
| Human-in-the-loop | User confirmation UI; internal review queue for premium/critical items (with consent and strict access controls) | Build |
| Output | Canonical nodes with provenance + page/bbox references | Build |
Accuracy targets (to validate in pilot): ≥ 98% field accuracy on confirmed lab values; ≥ 95% on printed prescriptions after confirmation; clause-citation precision ≥ 95% on policy Q&A. Track per lab chain and insurer template.
10.5 Technology choices (indicative)
| Layer | Options | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud | Hyperscaler India regions (Mumbai/Hyderabad/Delhi NCR/Pune) | Keep all personal data in India; DR in a second India region |
| FHIR server | HAPI FHIR (OSS) or a managed FHIR service available in an India region | NRCES profile validation [S6] |
| ABDM integration | Own implementation on V3, referencing NHA’s open-source ABDM-wrapper [S60] | The wrapper is Spring Boot + MongoDB; evaluate for reuse vs reference |
| Graph/relational | PostgreSQL (person-partitioned, row-level security) + edge tables; or a graph DB if query patterns justify it | Simplicity favours Postgres for MVP |
| Time series | Timescale/ClickHouse-class store for device data | Daily aggregates by default |
| Search | Per-person encrypted index | Avoid cross-person indexes on C3/C4 data |
| Policy engine | OPA-style ABAC | Single enforcement point |
| Mobile | Kotlin (Android) + Swift (iOS), or cross-platform with native Health Connect/HealthKit modules | Health Connect and HealthKit need native code |
| Terminology | SNOMED CT (India NRC), LOINC, ICD-10, UCUM, ATC [S50] | Licence registrations |
| LLM | India-hosted model endpoints with no-retention terms, or self-hosted open models | Behind the AI Gateway |
| Messaging | WhatsApp Business Platform via a BSP; SMS via DLT-registered templates (TRAI) | Opt-in records; template approval |
10.6 Non-functional requirements
| NFR | Target (MVP) |
|---|---|
| Availability | 99.5% app/API; data-push endpoint 99.9% (ABDM pushes must not be lost) |
| Latency | Timeline load < 2 s on 4G for 500 items; Snapshot < 5 s |
| Document turnaround | Parsed result < 60 s for a typical 2-page lab report |
| Scalability | Person-partitioned design; horizontal scaling of ingestion workers |
| Privacy | 100% of reads pass the policy engine; zero C4 data in logs |
| Erasure | Source-level erasure executed within a defined SLA; backups age out within the defined backup-retention window |
| Accessibility | WCAG 2.1 AA-aligned; font scaling; screen-reader labels; read-aloud |
| Localisation | All user-facing strings externalised; medical glossary per language reviewed by clinicians |
11. MVP Scope and Roadmap
11.1 Source prioritisation (value × feasibility)
| Source | User value | Feasibility | MVP decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lab report PDFs/photos | Very high (most common artefact; trends) | High | Include (core) |
| Prescriptions (printed + handwritten with confirmation) | High (medicine list) | Medium | Include |
| Discharge summaries | High (hospitalisation history) | Medium | Include |
| Insurance policy schedule + CIS + e-card | Very high (paid wedge) | High | Include (core) |
| Claim letters / settlement advices | High | High | Include |
| Pharmacy invoices | High (medicines + spend) | High | Include |
| ABDM records (PHR + HIU) | High where available; trust anchor | Medium (certification on critical path) | Include: launch with document flows if ABDM production access is still pending |
| Health Connect / HealthKit | Medium (chronic-care context) | High | Include (steps, sleep, weight, BP, glucose, heart rate) |
| Manual entry (allergies, history, family history, vitals) | Medium | High | Include |
| Vendor wearable clouds (Oura, Withings, Fitbit, Garmin) | Low–Medium in India | Medium | Phase 2 |
| Nutrition logging | Medium (diabetes users) | Medium (Indian dish DB needed) | Phase 2 |
| Mental-wellbeing check-ins | Medium | High technically / high governance need | Phase 2 (after clinical safety sign-off) |
| Payer/TPA/employer feeds | Very high | Low (partnerships) | Phase 2 (pilot partners) |
| NHCX (via provider SaaS / partner) | High | Low | Phase 3 |
| AA insurance data | Medium | Low–Medium | Phase 2 discovery |
| Email-inbox scanning (Gmail API) | Medium | Low (restricted-scope assessment) [S33] | Not planned; use forwarding instead |
11.2 90-day MVP definition
Target users for the pilot: urban/semi-urban Android users aged 30–60 who manage a chronic condition, or who care for a parent with one, and hold at least one health insurance policy (retail or group). Pilot in 1–2 cities and 2 languages (English + Hindi; add one regional language if the pilot city requires).
Must-have features
| # | Feature | Acceptance criteria |
|---|---|---|
| F1 | Account, language choice, consent onboarding with purpose catalogue | All purposes separately toggleable; consent ledger records every event; notice in 2 languages |
| F2 | ABHA create/login + record discovery/linking + self-requested fetch (PHR + HIU) | Sandbox-certified flows; production when credentials are granted; partial-delivery tracking |
| F3 | Document ingestion: upload, camera, share-sheet, WhatsApp-forward, email-forward | Classification + person-assignment prompt; offline queue |
| F4 | Lab report, prescription, discharge summary, pharmacy invoice parsing with confirmation UI | Confidence routing; source crop view; corrections logged |
| F5 | Policy + CIS + e-card parsing; coverage card; waiting-period calculator; clause citations | Every coverage statement cites a clause span |
| F6 | Claim tracker (document-driven) + deduction/denial explainer | Status timeline; denial taxonomy; deductions sum check |
| F7 | Unified timeline + clinical summary + Snapshot (PDF + time-bound doctor-share link) | Tier badges; data-coverage statement; share link expiry + access log |
| F8 | Trends for key labs and vitals; duplicate-molecule check; refill estimates; medicine reminders | Rules unit-tested; clinical safety officer sign-off on wording |
| F9 | Care-gap reminders (limited, clinician-approved rule set: diabetes, hypertension, NP-NCD 30+ screening, child UIP) | Each reminder cites rule + guideline; dismissible |
| F10 | Spend dashboard (OOP vs reimbursed; recurring costs) | Reimbursements offset correctly |
| F11 | Family profiles: minors (verifiable parental consent) + adult invite with scoped caregiver grants | Sensitive categories excluded by default |
| F12 | Health Connect / HealthKit sync (selected types) | Per-type permission; daily aggregates |
| F13 | Consent dashboard, data export (FHIR + PDF), withdrawal + erasure, account deletion | Erasure executes end-to-end, including derived insights |
| F14 | Grounded Q&A assistant for the five reference question types (§7.7), with refusal patterns | Golden-set pass thresholds; citations on every answer |
| F15 | Emergency interrupt and helpline access | Red-flag terms tested in both languages |
Explicitly out of MVP: provider cohort dashboards; insurer/TPA integrations; policy recommendations or sales; drug-interaction alerts beyond duplicate molecules; mental-health screeners; nutrition logging; vendor wearable clouds; UHI booking; marketplace referrals.
MVP data model: the Section 6 entities Person, Relationship, ABHA Identity, Consent Record, Caregiver Grant, Facility, Clinician, Encounter, Condition, Allergy, Immunization, Medication, Medication Dispense, Lab Result, Diagnostic Report, Vital, Wearable Metric (daily), Activity, Sleep, Insurance Policy, Coverage, Exclusion, Waiting Period, Premium, Claim, Expense, Care Gap, Alert, all with the common provenance envelope.
MVP consent flows: onboarding purposes (P1, P3, P4,
P5, P6 opt-in); ABDM self-access (P2,
PATRQT/STORE); doctor-share (P7,
VIEW, time-bound); caregiver grants (P8); P10/P11/P12
off and not prompted in MVP.
MVP workstreams and exit criteria (scheduling is left to the team)
| Workstream | Key deliverables | Exit criterion |
|---|---|---|
| Compliance & legal | DPIA; notices; consent catalogue; processor agreements; legal opinions (IRDAI, SaMD, HDM retention) | Opinions received; DPIA signed by DPO |
| ABDM integration | Sandbox registration (V3); M1 + PHR flows + M3; functional tests; WASA audit; sandbox-exit application | Sandbox test cases passed; audit findings closed; production request filed |
| Document AI | Classifiers; lab/prescription/invoice/policy/claim extractors; confirmation UI | Accuracy targets met on pilot corpus |
| Graph & insights | Canonical model; dedup/conflict rules; rule library v1; trends; spend | Clinical safety officer sign-off; unit-test coverage on rules |
| App & UX | Android-first app (iOS if resourced), 2 languages, accessibility | Usability tests with low-literacy and elderly participants |
| Security | KMS envelope encryption; ABAC; audit log; pen test | Pen test with no open critical/high findings |
| Pilot ops | Recruitment, support desk, grievance workflow | Pilot cohort onboarded |
11.3 MVP success metrics
| Metric | Definition | Pilot target (hypothesis to validate) |
|---|---|---|
| Activation | % of sign-ups adding ≥1 record within 24h | ≥ 60% |
| ABHA link rate | % of users who link/create ABHA | ≥ 40% |
| HIP fetch yield | Average consented HIP connections per ABHA-linked user; % yielding ≥1 record | Measure (baseline) |
| Structured share | % ABDM records with coded Observations vs PDF-only | Measure (baseline) |
| Parse accuracy | Field accuracy after confirmation (labs / prescriptions / policies) | ≥ 98% / ≥ 95% / ≥ 95% |
| Time to Snapshot | From first upload to Snapshot | < 10 minutes |
| Insurance engagement | % users with a parsed policy who open a coverage answer | ≥ 50% |
| Care gaps | Gaps surfaced per user; % marked done within the pilot | Measure |
| Doctor-share | % of users sharing a Snapshot with a clinician | ≥ 15% |
| Retention | D30 retention (caregiver and chronic segments) | ≥ 35% |
| Trust | % of users reporting they understand who can see their data (survey) | ≥ 80% |
| Safety | Clinically significant errors reaching users | 0 tolerated; all near-misses reviewed |
| Conversion (if paywall tested) | Premium/family plan conversion | Measure by price-point A/B |
11.4 Phase 2 (after MVP validation)
| Theme | Capabilities |
|---|---|
| Insurance depth | Payer/TPA/employer pilot integrations (claim-status events, e-cards, network lists); AA insurance-data discovery; cashless pre-admission checklist; renewal-risk alerts (information only) |
| Clinical depth | Licensed drug-interaction checks with clinician-approved severity filtering; expanded care-gap library (cardiac, thyroid, CKD, maternal, adult vaccination); clinician-review queue (premium) |
| Lifestyle | Indian-dish nutrition logging (IFCT-based, dietitian-curated); vendor wearable clouds (Oura, Withings, Fitbit, Garmin with approval); CGM CSV import |
| Mental wellbeing | Opt-in mood check-ins and validated screeners with crisis routing (after safety sign-off) |
| ABDM | Act as HIP to re-share user documents and wellness records; Scan & Share support |
| B2B2C | Employer benefits-navigation offering (aggregated reporting only) |
| Languages | 6–8 Indian languages with clinician-reviewed glossaries; voice-first navigation |
11.5 Phase 3
| Theme | Capabilities |
|---|---|
| Provider SaaS | Clinician dashboard for patient-shared summaries; consented care-gap lists; NHCX participation as provider technology partner (eligibility/pre-auth/claim) [S59] |
| Care navigation | UHI-based booking for diagnostics/consults to close gaps [S13]; neutral ranking with conflict disclosures |
| Insurance (regulated) | If licensing obtained or via a registered partner: compliant comparison/renewal journeys |
| Research & population health | Opt-in, ethics-approved, de-identified research programme [S44]; aggregated benchmarks for employers/payers |
| Advanced analytics | Validated risk models only with regulatory clearance where required (CDSCO) |
| Environment | AQI-aware respiratory insights (opt-in, coarse location) |
12. Build vs Partner Decisions
| Capability | Decision | Rationale | Candidate partner types | Licence / regulatory note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ABDM integration (M1, PHR, M3, M2) | Build (reference NHA’s open-source wrapper [S60]) | Core competency; certification owned by the company | NHA integration support | ABDM certification + WASA audit |
| Consent ledger & policy engine | Build | Core trust IP | — | DPDP |
| Health Graph & canonicalisation | Build | Core IP; quality differentiator | — | Terminology licences |
| FHIR server | Adopt OSS / managed | Commodity | HAPI FHIR; managed FHIR in India region | Data residency |
| OCR engine | Partner/buy | Commodity; multilingual handwriting is hard | Cloud OCR vendors (India region), Indian OCR specialists | Processor agreement; no-training clause; residency |
| Document understanding (lab/prescription/policy/claim) | Build on top of OCR | Indian templates and clause extraction are differentiators | Annotation vendors (under strict DPAs, synthetic/de-identified data) | Consent P10 or synthetic data only |
| Indian brand→molecule dictionary | License + curate | Coverage and update burden | Indian drug-information publishers | Commercial licence |
| Drug-interaction knowledge base | License | Clinical liability; maintenance | Global DDI knowledge-base vendors | Commercial licence; clinical governance |
| Terminology (SNOMED CT, LOINC, ICD-10) | License (free/affiliate) | Standards | NRCES (SNOMED CT India NRC) [S50]; Regenstrief (LOINC) | Affiliate registrations |
| Nutrition database | License + curate | Indian dish coverage | ICMR-NIN (IFCT) [S34]; academic datasets; dietitians | Licence for commercial use ⚠ Validate |
| Wearable connectivity | Build on Health Connect/HealthKit; partner with vendors later | OS aggregators give broad coverage cheaply | Garmin/Samsung partner programmes | Platform policies [S25][S26] |
| Multilingual (ASR/TTS/translation) | Partner | Speed to multi-language | Bhashini [S58]; commercial Indian-language AI vendors | Clinician review of medical translations |
| LLM | Partner/self-host behind own AI Gateway | Rapid evolution; keep control layer in-house | India-region model hosting; open-weight models | No-retention, residency |
| WhatsApp / SMS | Partner | Regulated channels | WhatsApp BSPs; DLT-registered SMS aggregators | Opt-in; template approval; TRAI DLT |
| Payer/TPA/employer data | Partner | No public APIs | Insurers, TPAs, employee-benefit platforms | Data-sharing agreements; IRDAI considerations |
| Insurance distribution | Partner (if pursued) | Licensing | IRDAI-registered intermediary | ⚖ Opinion required |
| Tele-consult / clinician review | Partner | Regulated practice | RMP networks/telemedicine providers compliant with TPG 2020 [S21] | Telemedicine guidelines |
| Diagnostics/pharmacy fulfilment | Partner | Not core; conflict-of-interest risk | Lab chains, licensed pharmacies | Disclosures; drug-law compliance |
| Security operations | Hybrid | 24×7 coverage | MSSP for SOC; CERT-In empanelled auditors | CERT-In directions |
13. Key Risks and Mitigations
| # | Risk | Category | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Breach of health data | Security | Medium | Severe | Envelope encryption + crypto-shredding; no standing access; SIEM; pen tests; runbook (6h CERT-In, 72h Board) [S12][S20]; cyber insurance | CISO |
| R2 | Invalid or bundled consent (DPDP non-compliance) | Privacy | Medium | High | Purpose catalogue; unbundled toggles; versioned multilingual notices; consent receipts; UX audits against dark-pattern guidelines [S45] | DPO |
| R3 | Purpose creep (using care data for marketing, model training, underwriting) | Privacy | Medium | High | Policy engine enforces purpose; P10–P12 off by default; data-use review board | DPO |
| R4 | Over-retention of ABDM data beyond dataEraseAt |
Compliance | Medium | High | Automated erasure scheduler tied to artifacts; audits; erasure tests in CI [S60] | Eng lead |
| R5 | Cross-border transfer via LLM/OCR vendors | Compliance | Medium | High | India-region processing; redaction; contractual controls; vendor register | DPO |
| R6 | Misread lab value or drug dose from OCR | Clinical safety | High | High | Confidence thresholds; mandatory confirmation for drug lines; plausibility checks; source crops; low-confidence data excluded from insights | Clinical safety officer |
| R7 | Misinterpretation of lab values / false reassurance | Clinical safety | Medium | High | Lab-specific ranges; approved language; no “normal for you”; “absence of data ≠ absence of disease” | CSO |
| R8 | LLM hallucination | AI safety | Medium | High | Rules-first; grounding + citation checker; numbers from structured fields; golden-set evaluation per release | AI lead |
| R9 | Delayed care / missed emergency | Clinical safety | Low–Medium | Severe | Red-flag interrupts; helplines; no triage claims; critical-value prompts | CSO |
| R10 | Product classified as a medical device (SaMD) | Regulatory | Medium | High | Intended-use statement; informational design; early CDSCO-focused legal opinion; QMS readiness if needed [S22] | Regulatory lead |
| R11 | Insurance features deemed unlicensed intermediation | Regulatory | Medium | High | No recommendations/sales; legal opinion; partner with registered intermediary if needed [S47] | Legal |
| R12 | Low ABDM record yield (few HIPs, PDF-only bundles) | Data access | High | Medium | Document-first strategy; measure yield; HIP onboarding partnerships; re-request flows | Product |
| R13 | ABDM certification delays / API version changes | Delivery | Medium | Medium | Start sandbox early; build on V3; abstraction layer; track NHA advisories [S59][S60] | Eng lead |
| R14 | Insurer/TPA refuse data partnerships | Commercial | High | Medium | Value proposition for payers (complete documents, fewer queries); start with employer channel; document intelligence remains self-sufficient | BD |
| R15 | Wearable API changes (Google Fit shutdown, Fitbit migration) | Technical | High | Low–Medium | Health Connect/HealthKit as primary; vendor APIs optional [S26][S27][S28] | Mobile lead |
| R16 | Wrong-person records on shared family phones | Data quality / privacy | High | High | Person-match checks; “whose report is this?”; separate profiles; ABHA demographic checks | Product |
| R17 | Elderly/low-literacy users can’t give meaningful consent | Trust / legal | Medium | High | Vernacular audio notices; assisted consent with own-device confirmation; legal review of sufficiency | Design + Legal |
| R18 | Commercial bias in recommendations (marketplace) | Trust | Medium | High | Neutral ranking; disclosures; marketplace out of MVP; ethics review | CEO |
| R19 | Becoming an attractive central data honeypot | Security / trust | Medium | Severe | Minimise retention; user-controlled deletion; per-person keys; optional on-device-only mode for sensitive categories | CISO |
| R20 | DPDP Rules interpretation changes / SDF designation | Regulatory | Medium | Medium | Regulatory watch; design to strictest reading; DPIA cadence | DPO |
| R21 | Incompatible formats / terminology gaps (local test names, Indian brands) | Data quality | High | Medium | Terminology team; mapping tables with review; feedback loops from corrections | Clinical informatics |
| R22 | Trust erosion from opaque insights | Trust | Medium | High | Explainability standard (§8.4); source badges; easy corrections; transparency reports | Product |
14. Open Questions and Validation Plan
| # | Question | Why it matters | Validation experiment | Decision informed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | Will consumers link ABHA and approve ABDM consents? | Determines the weight of ABDM vs documents | Pilot with 100–500 users: measure ABHA link rate, consent approval, drop-off per step | ABDM prominence in onboarding |
| Q2 | What is the actual ABDM record yield and structure? | Determines parsing and insight design | Instrument HIP discovery/fetch: % with records, records/user, % coded vs PDF; break down by facility type | Investment in FHIR vs PDF pipelines |
| Q3 | Which sources create the most perceived value? | Prioritisation | In-pilot ranking + usage analytics across lab PDFs, policies, claims, pharmacy invoices, wearables | Phase 2 priorities |
| Q4 | Is insurance clarity the paid wedge? | Business model | Fake-door + price A/B tests (individual vs family plan); willingness-to-pay interviews | Pricing and packaging |
| Q5 | Can policy parsing be accurate across insurers? | Core feature feasibility | Build a corpus of retail + group policy documents from top insurers (user-contributed with consent, or public sample wordings); measure clause-citation precision | Insurer coverage roadmap |
| Q6 | Do clinicians use patient-shared Snapshots? | Provider value | Pilot with 5–20 clinicians: time-to-history, completeness, satisfaction; qualitative interviews | Phase 3 provider SaaS |
| Q7 | Will insurers/TPAs/employers partner? | Data access | Structured interviews with insurers, TPAs, benefits platforms; propose a document-completeness pilot | Phase 2 partnerships |
| Q8 | Is NHCX ABHA↔︎policy linking going to be exposed to consumer apps? | Future insurance data rail | Written query to NHA integration support; monitor NHCX documentation [S59] | Insurance architecture |
| Q9 | Are risk flags/interaction alerts SaMD under CDSCO? | Scope and cost | Legal/regulatory opinion; review CDSCO software guidance ⚠ Validate | Phase 2 clinical features |
| Q10 | Do claim-assistance features require IRDAI authorisation? | Scope | Insurance counsel opinion | Claim assistance roadmap |
| Q11 | Do users understand trust tiers and consent screens? | Trust, legal validity | Comprehension tests (teach-back) in 2–3 languages with elderly and low-literacy participants | Consent UX |
| Q12 | Which analytics are trusted and acted upon? | Insight design | A/B explainability variants; measure care-gap closure and doctor-share | Insight engine roadmap |
| Q13 | What retention is permitted for ABDM-sourced data in a personal vault? | Data architecture | Review the current HDM Policy + ABDM terms; written clarification from NHA ⚠ Validate | Erasure defaults |
| Q14 | Does the company risk SDF designation? | Compliance cost | Legal assessment against DPDP criteria; scenario planning | DPO/audit budget |
| Q15 | Can WhatsApp-based document intake meet privacy expectations? | Ingestion channel | Security review of BSP data handling; user trust survey | Channel strategy |
15. Appendix: Source Links, Standards, and Glossary
Appendix A — Source register
Status: V = verified in-session from an official NHA repository · A = author-supplied in Playbook v1.0, not re-opened · K = official source known to the research team; URL/document to be confirmed.
| ID | Source | URL / locator | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | ABDM HIP/HIU Guidelines | https://abdm.gov.in/strapicms/uploads/HIP_HIU_Guidelines_f85df336ec.pdf | A |
| S2 | ABDM Building Blocks (v8.3 external) | https://abdm.gov.in/strapicms/uploads/ABDM_Building_Blocks_v8_3_External_Version_eabbc5c0f3_4_a96f40c649_57c96f3_4de80a9b9c.pdf | A |
| S3 | ABDM Guidance Document for ABDM-compliant HMIS/LMIS (FHIR) | https://abdm.gov.in/strapicms/uploads/Guidance_Document_for_ABDM_Compliant_HMIS_LMIS_d066e52a6d.pdf | A |
| S4 | Building HIU System — API Flow (M3) | https://sandboxcms.abdm.gov.in/uploads/Building_HIU_System_API_Flow_M3_Documentation_5327c6f3_4de80a9b9c.pdf | A |
| S5 | ABDM consent manager & gateway documentation (community) | https://docs.coronasafe.network/abdm-documentation/building-blocks/consent-manager-and-gateway | A (secondary) |
| S6 | NRCES FHIR R4 profiles for ABDM | https://www.nrces.in/ndhm/fhir/r4/profiles.html | A |
| S7 | NHCX package (GitHub) | https://github.com/nha-in/nhcx-package | A |
| S8 | PIB release on NHCX workflows | https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=2236366 | A |
| S9 | Account Aggregator Framework (DFS) | https://financialservices.gov.in/account-aggregator-framework | A |
| S10 | RBI Master Direction — NBFC-Account Aggregator | https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10598 | A |
| S11 | Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 | https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf | A |
| S12 | Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 | https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/nov/doc20251117695301.pdf | A |
| S13 | Unified Health Interface (UHI) | https://abdm.gov.in/uhi | A |
| S14 | ABDM portal and public dashboard | https://abdm.gov.in | K |
| S15 | ABDM Sandbox (V3) | https://sandbox.abdm.gov.in/sandbox/v3/ (URL as cited in NHA’s NHCX guide [S59]) | V (URL) |
| S16 | ABDM Health Data Management Policy (latest version) | abdm.gov.in → Resources/Policies | K |
| S17 | NRCES FHIR Implementation Guide (ABDM) | https://www.nrces.in/ndhm/fhir/r4/index.html | K |
| S18 | IRDAI Master Circular on Health Insurance Business (2024) and policyholder-protection circulars | https://irdai.gov.in (Circulars) | K |
| S19 | IRDAI (Insurance Products) Regulations, 2024 | https://irdai.gov.in (Regulations) | K |
| S20 | CERT-In Directions under s.70B(6) IT Act, 28 April 2022 | https://www.cert-in.org.in | K |
| S21 | Telemedicine Practice Guidelines, March 2020 | https://www.mohfw.gov.in/pdf/Telemedicine.pdf | K |
| S22 | Medical Devices Rules, 2017 and CDSCO notifications on software | https://cdsco.gov.in | K |
| S23 | Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 | https://www.indiacode.nic.in | K |
| S24 | Apple HealthKit documentation | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/healthkit | K |
| S25 | Apple App Review Guidelines (5.1.3 Health and Health Research) | https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/ | K |
| S26 | Android Health Connect developer guide | https://developer.android.com/health-and-fitness/guides/health-connect | K |
| S27 | Google Fit APIs (deprecation / migration) | https://developers.google.com/fit | K |
| S28 | Fitbit Web API reference | https://dev.fitbit.com/build/reference/web-api/ | K |
| S29 | Garmin Connect Developer Program | https://developer.garmin.com/gc-developer-program/ | K |
| S30 | Samsung Health developer (Data SDK) | https://developer.samsung.com/health | K |
| S31 | Oura Cloud API v2 | https://cloud.ouraring.com/v2/docs | K |
| S32 | Withings developer API | https://developer.withings.com | K |
| S33 | Google OAuth restricted-scope verification (CASA) | https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/production-readiness/restricted-scope-verification | K |
| S34 | ICMR-National Institute of Nutrition (IFCT 2017; Dietary Guidelines for Indians 2024; Nutrient Requirements 2020) | https://www.nin.res.in | K |
| S35 | National List of Essential Medicines 2022 | https://cdsco.gov.in / https://main.mohfw.gov.in | K |
| S36 | Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana product list | https://janaushadhi.gov.in | K |
| S37 | National Programme for Prevention and Control of NCDs (NP-NCD) operational guidelines | https://main.mohfw.gov.in | K |
| S38 | Universal Immunization Programme schedule | https://main.mohfw.gov.in | K |
| S39 | Tele-MANAS (National Tele Mental Health Programme) | https://telemanas.mohfw.gov.in | K |
| S40 | Anjana RM et al. Metabolic NCDs in India (ICMR-INDIAB), Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology, 2023 | doi:10.1016/S2213-8587(23)00119-5 | K |
| S41 | National Health Accounts Estimates for India (latest, NHSRC/MoHFW) | https://nhsrc.in | K |
| S42 | National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) | https://rchiips.org/nfhs/ | K |
| S43 | PM-JAY (NHA) and Ayushman Vay Vandana releases | https://nha.gov.in/PM-JAY; https://pib.gov.in | K |
| S44 | ICMR Ethical Guidelines for Application of AI in Biomedical Research and Healthcare (2023) | https://main.icmr.nic.in | K |
| S45 | CCPA Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023 | https://consumeraffairs.nic.in | K |
| S46 | Sahamati (AA industry alliance) and ReBIT AA technical standards | https://sahamati.org.in; https://api.rebit.org.in | K |
| S47 | IRDAI regulations on insurance intermediaries (web aggregators, corporate agents, brokers) | https://irdai.gov.in (Regulations) | K |
| S49 | Health Claims Exchange (HCX) protocol specification | Swasth/HCX protocol documentation (locate) | K |
| S50 | SNOMED CT National Release Centre, India (NRCES) | https://www.nrces.in | K |
| S52 | Draft Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Rules on sale of drugs by e-pharmacy, 2018 | https://cdsco.gov.in / e-Gazette | K |
| S58 | Bhashini (National Language Translation Mission, MeitY) | https://bhashini.gov.in | K |
| S59 | NHA-ABDM/NHCX repository: NHCX Postman collections (sandbox/production onboarding, participant and use-case APIs) and “NHCX – Guide for Providers” integrator deck; last commit 27 Sep 2024 | https://github.com/NHA-ABDM/nhcx | V |
| S60 | NHA-ABDM/ABDM-wrapper repository: ABDM reference
HIP/HIU implementation (V1→V3), consent Permission model,
HI-type enum, ECDH/AES-GCM crypto, V3 gateway usage; last commit 21 Feb
2025 |
https://github.com/NHA-ABDM/ABDM-wrapper | V |
IDs S48, S51 and S53–S57 are reserved and unused in this edition.
Appendix B — Verification checklist (clear before external use)
| # | Item | Where used | Check against |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | DPDP Rules 2025: notification date, commencement phases, breach-report timing (72h), log retention, notice content, Consent Manager conditions, children/healthcare exemptions | §1, §9 | S12 (official gazette text) |
| B2 | DPDP Act section numbers and penalty amounts | §9.2 | S11 |
| B3 | ABDM purpose codes (esp. PATRQT), frequency units,
current V3 consent and PHR-app APIs |
§5, §10 | ABDM sandbox V3 docs (S15), S4 |
| B4 | Current HI-type list (incl. Invoice) and NRCES profile versions | §4.1, §5 | S6, S17 |
| B5 | HDM Policy version; HIU storage/retention rules; ABDM breach-reporting obligations | §5, §9 | S16 |
| B6 | Sandbox exit steps; WASA/CERT-In auditor requirement | §5.6 | S15, S59, NHA integration support |
| B7 | ABHA/linked-record/HFR/HPR scale figures | §2.1 | S14 dashboard; PIB |
| B8 | Third-party consent managers in ABDM; DPDP Consent Manager interplay | §3.2 | S2, S16, S12 |
| B9 | NHCX: current onboarding counts; IRDAI direction; ABHA↔︎policy linking access for consumer/PHR apps | §3.4 | S8, S59, NHA |
| B10 | IRDAI 2024 health insurance norms (cashless timelines, PED/moratorium limits, CIS format, grievance/Ombudsman wording) | §2, §7 | S18, S19 |
| B11 | AA insurance FIP availability | §4.2 | S9, S46 |
| B12 | IRDAI intermediary triggers for recommendations/claim assistance | §9.6 | S47 + counsel |
| B13 | CDSCO position on clinical decision support software | §9.1 | S22 + counsel |
| B14 | Health Connect permission rules (history >30 days, background read), Play health-apps policy | §4.3, §7.3 | S26 |
| B15 | Google Fit shutdown date; Fitbit API migration; Oura token policy; Samsung SDK partner terms | §4.3 | S27, S28, S31, S30 |
| B16 | Apple Guideline 5.1.3 wording; Health Records availability in India | §4.3 | S24, S25 |
| B17 | IFCT/Indian food DB licensing | §4.4 | S34 |
| B18 | E-pharmacy rules status | §4.5 | S52 |
| B19 | SNOMED CT India licence terms and drug extension | §4.5 | S50 |
| B20 | NP-NCD screening protocol, UIP schedule | §8 | S37, S38 |
| B21 | Helpline numbers (112, 108, Tele-MANAS 14416) per state | §4.7, §9.4 | S39, state sources |
| B22 | OOP share, NCD prevalence, PM-JAY figures, NFHS-5 insurance coverage | §1, §2 | S40–S43 |
| B23 | Competitor ABDM integration status and features | §2.3 | ABDM integrator list; company sources |
| B24 | Bhashini API terms | §7.1 | S58 |
| B25 | LOINC/SNOMED codes in examples and rule library | §8.3, App. D | LOINC, SNOMED CT browsers |
Appendix C — Standards reference
| Standard | Use in product |
|---|---|
| HL7 FHIR R4 + NRCES ABDM profiles | Exchange, canonical clinical/insurance resources, export |
| NHCX FHIR profiles (Claim, ClaimResponse, CoverageEligibility, InsurancePlan…) | Normalisation target for policy/claim documents; future NHCX participation |
| SNOMED CT (India NRC) | Conditions, procedures, findings, drugs (India extension) |
| LOINC | Lab tests and vital-sign observations |
| ICD-10 | Diagnoses on claims and discharge summaries |
| UCUM | Units of measure |
| ATC | Drug classification (molecule level) |
| ECDH (Curve25519) + HKDF + AES-GCM | ABDM health-information transfer encryption [S60] |
| JWE (RFC 7516) | NHCX payload encryption [S59] |
| UHI / Beckn | Discovery and booking (later phases) |
| ReBIT AA specifications | If integrating Account Aggregator data (insurance FIPs) |
| ISO/IEC 27001 / 27701 | Information security and privacy management |
| OWASP ASVS / MASVS | Application and mobile security verification |
Appendix D — FHIR R4 examples (corrected)
Illustrative only. Validate against current NRCES profiles; ABDM
bundles wrap clinical content in Composition-based document
bundles (e.g. DiagnosticReportRecord, PrescriptionRecord,
DischargeSummaryRecord) [S6].
D.1 Patient (ABHA identifier)
{
"resourceType": "Patient",
"id": "patient-001",
"identifier": [{
"type": {"text": "ABHA address"},
"system": "https://healthid.abdm.gov.in",
"value": "ravi.kumar@abdm"
}],
"name": [{"text": "Ravi Kumar"}],
"gender": "male",
"birthDate": "1985-06-12"
}The identifier
systemURI is illustrative. Use the URI prescribed by the current NRCES Patient profile.
D.2 Observation: HbA1c (unchanged from v1.0 except reference-range structure)
{
"resourceType": "Observation",
"id": "observation-hba1c-001",
"status": "final",
"category": [{"coding": [{"system": "http://terminology.hl7.org/CodeSystem/observation-category", "code": "laboratory"}]}],
"code": {"coding": [{"system": "http://loinc.org", "code": "4548-4",
"display": "Hemoglobin A1c/Hemoglobin.total in Blood"}], "text": "HbA1c"},
"subject": {"reference": "urn:uuid:patient-001"},
"effectiveDateTime": "2026-09-10",
"valueQuantity": {"value": 7.1, "unit": "%", "system": "http://unitsofmeasure.org", "code": "%"},
"referenceRange": [{"low": {"value": 4.0, "unit": "%"}, "high": {"value": 5.6, "unit": "%"},
"text": "4.0 - 5.6% (laboratory-specific)"}]
}D.3 DiagnosticReport: laboratory (corrected: report code matches its content)
{
"resourceType": "DiagnosticReport",
"id": "diagnostic-report-lab-001",
"status": "final",
"category": [{"coding": [{"system": "http://terminology.hl7.org/CodeSystem/v2-0074", "code": "LAB", "display": "Laboratory"}]}],
"code": {"coding": [{"system": "http://loinc.org", "code": "4548-4",
"display": "Hemoglobin A1c/Hemoglobin.total in Blood"}], "text": "HbA1c report"},
"subject": {"reference": "urn:uuid:patient-001"},
"effectiveDateTime": "2026-09-10",
"issued": "2026-09-10T18:00:00+05:30",
"performer": [{"reference": "urn:uuid:organization-lab"}],
"result": [{"reference": "urn:uuid:observation-hba1c-001"}],
"presentedForm": [{"contentType": "application/pdf", "title": "Laboratory Report",
"url": "urn:uuid:binary-lab-report-001"}]
}v1.0 used LOINC 24323-8 (comprehensive metabolic panel) as the report code while the only result was HbA1c. Use a panel code only when the report contains that panel’s results.
D.4 DocumentReference: discharge summary (corrected LOINC code)
{
"resourceType": "DocumentReference",
"id": "document-discharge-summary-001",
"status": "current",
"type": {"coding": [{"system": "http://loinc.org", "code": "18842-5", "display": "Discharge summary"}],
"text": "Discharge Summary"},
"subject": {"reference": "urn:uuid:patient-001"},
"context": {"encounter": [{"reference": "urn:uuid:encounter-ip-001"}]},
"content": [{"attachment": {"contentType": "application/pdf", "title": "Discharge Summary",
"url": "urn:uuid:binary-discharge-001"}}]
}v1.0 used 34117-2 (“History and physical note”). The NRCES DischargeSummaryRecord is a
Composition-based document. A SNOMED CT type such as 373942005 (Discharge summary) may be used there; validate against the profile.
D.5 MedicationRequest. The v1.0 structure is
retained. Recommendations: code medications with SNOMED
CT (as used in NRCES profiles) plus ATC where useful; keep the
brand name in medicationCodeableConcept.text; never store
dose inferred from OCR without user confirmation.
D.6 Claim (FHIR). The v1.0 example is retained as an internal normalisation target. Note that NHCX claim bundles follow NRCES/NHCX-specific profiles and are exchanged only between participants (PAYER/PROVIDER/TPA) using JWE encryption [S59].
D.7 Internal Coverage-clause object (non-FHIR helper)
{
"policy_id": "pol-001",
"benefit": "day_care_procedure",
"item": "Cataract surgery",
"limit": {"amount": 40000, "currency": "INR", "per": "eye"},
"waiting_period": {"type": "specific_disease", "months": 24,
"continuous_cover_start": "2025-03-15", "ends_on": "2027-03-15"},
"clause_ref": {"document_id": "doc-policy-wording-001", "page": 14, "span": [1203, 1388],
"text_hash": "sha256:…"},
"extraction": {"confidence": 0.96, "verification": "user_confirmed"},
"trust_tier": "T2"
}Appendix E — Glossary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| AA | Account Aggregator (RBI-regulated NBFC-AA; data-blind consent conduit for financial data) |
| ABDM | Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (National Health Authority) |
| ABHA | Ayushman Bharat Health Account (14-digit number; ABHA address as a handle) |
| Care context | Provider-side grouping of health records (e.g. a visit) linked to an ABHA address |
| CIS | Customer Information Sheet: IRDAI-mandated summary of a health policy’s key terms |
| CM / HIE-CM | Health Information Exchange–Consent Manager |
| Consent artifact | Machine-readable, signed record of a patient’s consent in ABDM |
| Data Fiduciary / Data Principal | DPDP terms for the entity determining purpose and means of processing / the individual |
| DPB | Data Protection Board of India |
| DPDP | Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (and Rules, 2025) |
| FHIR | HL7 Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources |
| FIP / FIU | Financial Information Provider / User (AA framework) |
| HFR / HPR | Health Facility Registry / Healthcare Professionals Registry |
| HIP / HIU | Health Information Provider / User |
| HI type | ABDM health-information type (OPConsultation, Prescription, DischargeSummary, DiagnosticReport, ImmunizationRecord, HealthDocumentRecord, WellnessRecord) |
| M1 / M2 / M3 | ABDM integration milestones: ABHA; HIP linking and sharing; HIU consent and import |
| NHCX | National Health Claims Exchange (provider↔︎payer/TPA claims rail) |
| NRCES | National Resource Centre for EHR Standards (FHIR IG; SNOMED CT NRC for India) |
| OOP | Out-of-pocket expenditure |
| PED | Pre-existing disease (insurance) |
| PHR | Personal Health Record (app) |
| RMP | Registered Medical Practitioner |
| SaMD | Software as a Medical Device |
| SDF | Significant Data Fiduciary (DPDP) |
| TPA | Third-Party Administrator (health insurance claims) |
| Trust tier | This report’s labelling of data provenance (T1 verified clinical … T6 reference knowledge) |
| UHI | Unified Health Interface (open protocol for discovery, booking, fulfilment) |
| WASA | Web Application Security Assessment (ABDM security testing) |